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people. But FOSTA, like its predecessors, fails to provide real relief to its
intended beneficiaries. Instead, it falls into the trap of punitiveness by
prioritizing punishing offenders over providing meaningful relief for sextrafficking survivors. By shifting the focus away from punitiveness and
toward actual aid, this Note proposes a solution that helps sex-trafficking
survivors without endangering free internet speech, consensual sex workers,
or others currently affected by FOSTA’s speech restrictions. This solution
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“While currently the impact of FOSTA/SESTA is felt most acutely by those
of us participating in the commercial sex trade, this bill affects everyone—
escorts are just the canaries in the coal mine trying to make our warning call
before it’s too late.”
—Lucy Khan†

INTRODUCTION
After months of public controversy, yet near unanimous congressional
approval, the Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act
(FOSTA)1 became law on April 11, 2018.2 FOSTA modified existing law in
† Lucy Khan, Against FOSTA/SESTA: One Canary’s Cry from Inside the Coal Mine, SLIXA BLOG:
EXPERIENCE (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.slixa.com/blog/experience/against-fosta-sesta-one-canarys-cryfrom-inside-the-coal-mine [https://perma.cc/XW89-F5B9] (arguing that FOSTA’s main effect so far has
been to promote censorship of sexual speech online rather than ending sex trafficking).
1 Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA), Pub. L. 115-164, 132 Stat.
1253 (2018) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2421A & 47 U.S.C § 230). FOSTA also includes key
provisions of the Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act (SESTA). The Act is commonly known both as
“FOSTA” and “FOSTA–SESTA.” See, e.g., Aja Romano, A New Law Intended to Curb Sex Trafficking
Threatens the Future of the Internet as We Know It, VOX (July 2, 2018, 1:08 PM),
https://www.vox.com/culture/2018/4/13/17172762/fosta-sesta-backpage-230-internet-freedom
[https://perma.cc/6BJC-WFML]. For the sake of brevity, and in accordance with the Act’s Short Title,
this Note refers to the Act simply as FOSTA.
2 FOSTA; see also World Without Exploitation, Effective Lobbying Starts with Listening: How
Survivor Voices Drove the Fight for Passage of FOSTA-SESTA, MEDIUM (May 3, 2018),
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two ways to help combat online sex trafficking. First, FOSTA amended
§ 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA),3 abrogating previous
interpretations that construed § 230 as an impervious shield for internet
service providers, even those who aided sex traffickers.4 Second, FOSTA
amended the Mann Act, an anti-prostitution and antitrafficking law,5 to
provide for civil and criminal liability against an online service provider that
“promotes or facilitates . . . prostitution” or operates their services “in
reckless disregard of the fact that such conduct contributed to sex
trafficking.”6 This amendment further provides a right to civil recovery and
restitution for sex-trafficking victims against these providers.7
Despite its noble intentions, FOSTA rapidly drew fire for its impact on
internet speech. Although “advertising” is the only speech explicitly
mentioned in the Act,8 FOSTA chills internet speech by curtailing immunity
for online service providers and providing civil and criminal liability for
promoting and facilitating prostitution or acting with “reckless disregard” for
sex trafficking.9 Groups that advocate for free speech and decriminalizing
sex work, like the Woodhull Freedom Foundation10 and Human Rights
Watch,11 argue that the Act impermissibly chills their First Amendment
rights, including the First Amendment rights of sex workers, sex-work and
antitrafficking advocates, and online speakers in general.12 Even
https://medium.com/world-without-exploitation/effective-lobbying-starts-with-listening-ec0b3abc3cc1
[https://perma.cc/FE4A-E2CF].
3 FOSTA, sec. 2, § 230.
4 See, e.g., Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 23 (1st Cir. 2016) (finding that § 230
shields online service providers from liability for criminal content posted by third parties); see also Eric
Goldman, The Ten Most Important Section 230 Rulings, 20 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 2–9 (2017)
(describing § 230, which shields internet service providers from claims based on third-party content, and
important § 230 cases that illustrate the provision’s breadth).
5 FOSTA, sec. 3, § 2421A; see also Danielle Citron & Quinta Jurecic, FOSTA: The New Anti-SexTrafficking Legislation May Not End the Internet, but It’s Not Good Law Either, LAWFARE (Mar. 28,
2018, 2:41 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/fosta-new-anti-sex-trafficking-legislation-may-not-endinternet-its-not-good-law-either [https://perma.cc/9VYZ-YK5Z] (describing FOSTA’s provisions and
amendments to the CDA and the Mann Act).
6
FOSTA, sec. 3, § 2421A(b).
7 Id.
8 Id. sec. 2, § 230 (“[S]ection 230 . . . was never intended to provide legal protection to websites that
unlawfully promote and facilitate prostitution and websites that facilitate traffickers in advertising the
sale of unlawful sex acts with sex trafficking victims . . . .” (emphasis added)).
9 Id. sec. 3, § 2421A(b) (prohibiting use of websites to promote or facilitate prostitution and other
acts “in reckless disregard” of sex trafficking).
10 Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief ¶ 15, Woodhull Freedom Found. v. United States,
334 F. Supp. 3d 185 (D.D.C. 2018) (No. 1:18-cv-01552) [hereinafter Complaint].
11 Id. ¶ 16.
12 See id. ¶¶ 2, 5, 52–53; see also infra Section I.C.
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nonadvocacy websites, such as Craigslist, have made their fears known to
users and eliminated certain sections of their sites.13
Advocates of decriminalizing sex work, sex workers themselves,14 and
even some antitrafficking activists have denounced FOSTA for its effects on
the online commercial sex trade.15 Many decriminalization advocates, for
example, fear that their work to improve the lives of a disenfranchised,
marginalized, and predominately female community of sex workers will
subject them to liability under FOSTA.16 Moreover, upon FOSTA’s passage,
websites that advocates and sex workers utilized to exchange information
about resources for people in or seeking to leave the sex trade either shut
down or banned all sex-work-related content for fear of liability.17 Losing
these resources, which provided information about free services available to
sex workers and sex-trafficking victims, as well as warnings about violent
pimps and clients,18 also resulted in sex workers losing the ability to screen
clients and work indoors rather than on the streets, a much riskier location.19
In sum, FOSTA makes sex work more dangerous. Restricting speech
related to commercial sex puts people engaged in sex work—including those
13

Complaint, supra note 10, ¶ 17 (stating that Craigslist had stopped allowing advertisements by a
massage therapist); Romano, supra note 1 (noting that Craigslist eliminated its “Personals” section due
to concerns it might be illegal under FOSTA).
14 Although FOSTA uses the term “prostitution,” this Note uses the term “sex work” where possible
in order to be more inclusive of the various forms of sex-related work affected by FOSTA’s prohibitions
and because many involved in the sex industry prefer this term. Prostitution and Sex Work, 14 GEO. J.
GENDER & L. 553, 553 n.1 (2013).
15 See Melissa Gira Grant, Proposed Federal Trafficking Legislation Has Surprising Opponents:
Advocates Who Work with Trafficking Victims, APPEAL (Jan. 26, 2018), https://theappeal.org/proposedfederal-trafficking-legislation-has-surprising-opponents-advocates-who-work-with-bf418c73d5b4
[https://perma.cc/KFB2-X6KR]; Romano, supra note 1; see also Complaint, supra note 10, ¶¶ 73–76
(describing the Woodhull Freedom Foundation’s fear of liability based on its political activities regarding
decriminalizing sex work and improving sex workers’ lives); id. ¶¶ 102–10 (describing activist and
advocate Alex Andrews’s use of the internet to advocate for sex workers’ well-being and provide
resources for them); Khan, supra note † (describing how FOSTA has led to internet censorship and
affected her personally as an entrepreneur in the sex industry).
16 See Complaint, supra note 10, ¶¶ 110–20 (describing Andrews’s fear of liability based on the
removal of § 230 immunity).
17 See Emily McCombs, ‘This Bill Is Killing Us’: 9 Sex Workers on Their Lives in the Wake of
FOSTA, HUFFPOST (May 15, 2018), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/sex-workers-sestafosta_us_5ad0d7d0e4b0edca2cb964d9 [https://perma.cc/YP2H-XKFR] (describing FOSTA’s impact on
resources for sex workers).
18 See id.; see also Complaint, supra note 10, ¶¶ 103–10 (describing “Rate That Rescue,” a website
that helps sex workers find resources to improve their health and welfare).
19 McCombs, supra note 17. FOSTA brought increased scrutiny to online platforms that sex workers
used to screen and find interested clients; as one woman who works as an escort stated, FOSTA is “forcing
me to go back to the streets, walking up and down trying to find clients . . . . [Clients] know this bill is in
effect, and trust me, they are taking full advantage of it by being more aggressive.” Id.
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trafficked into sex work—at an elevated risk of physical harm. Indeed, since
FOSTA’s passage, some law enforcement agencies have noted increased
violence against sex workers.20 This effect is particularly troubling given
pimps’ propensity to abuse sex workers, transforming their work from
arguably voluntary to fully coerced, thereby turning these workers into sextrafficking victims.21 Thus, rather than ending sex trafficking as intended,22
FOSTA makes it easier for traffickers to victimize already vulnerable
people.23
Overall, despite FOSTA’s important goals of combating online sex
trafficking and allowing sex-trafficking survivors to obtain financial
recovery, it is far from an ideal solution. Notably, FOSTA presents First
Amendment concerns regarding its chilling effect on internet speech.24
Indeed, FOSTA’s speech restrictions pose concerns for all kinds of internet
speakers; it sets a precedent that could be used to support further speech
restrictions in the future.25 What is more, by significantly curtailing online
speech, the law’s broad provisions have effectively silenced sex workers’
online speech, as well as online speech advocating for decriminalizing
prostitution and other forms of sex work.26 These workers now face threats

20

See Ted Andersen, Sarah Ravani & Megan Cassidy, The Scanner: Sex Workers Returned to SF
Streets After Backpage.com Shut Down, S.F. CHRON. (Oct. 15, 2018, 11:45 AM),
https://www.sfchronicle.com/crime/article/The-Scanner-Sex-workers-returned-to-SF-streets13304257.php [https://perma.cc/9V77-6MPC].
21
See McCombs, supra note 17 (describing how pimps have begun recruiting formerly independent
sex workers); see also Crystal A. Jackson & Jenny Heineman, Repeal FOSTA and Decriminalize Sex
Work, 17 CONTEXTS 74, 75 (2018) (arguing that criminalizing all forms of sex work “pushes some sex
workers to rely on managers (‘pimps’) who may be another source of violence or exploitation”); Allison
J. Luzwick, Human Trafficking and Pornography: Using the Trafficking Victims Protection Act to
Prosecute Trafficking for the Production of Internet Pornography, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 355, 366–67
(2017) (arguing that some pimp–worker relationships that begin as consensual become coercive as pimps
manipulate, threaten, defraud, and even drug workers into compliance).
22 H.R. REP. NO. 115-572, pt. 1, at 3 (2018) (“[FOSTA] is designed to combat online sex
trafficking . . . .”); id. at 5–6 (noting the “traumatic effects” of sex trafficking and that FOSTA will help
survivors recover restitution and file civil claims against online service providers who profit from their
exploitation in online ads).
23 See Jackson & Heineman, supra note 21, at 74; see also Luzwick supra note 21, at 361, 365, 371
(describing how many individuals are trafficked into performing unconsented pornography and
prostitution, often involving relationships that start as consensual and become exploitative).
24 See infra Sections I.A, II.I.C (explaining First Amendment doctrine and FOSTA’s implications
for free speech).
25
See Eric Goldman, The Complicated Story of FOSTA and Section 230, 17 FIRST AMEND. L. REV.
279, 293 (2019) (arguing that FOSTA could be “just the first of a string of new statutory exceptions to
section 230” jeopardizing the future of online speech).
26 See Khan, supra note † (describing how sex workers have lost their ability to engage in transactions
and advocate for themselves online); Complaint, supra note 10, ¶¶ 86–92 (explaining Human Rights
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to their livelihoods and their lives, with fewer resources than ever that could
provide meaningful aid.27
In light of these concerns about FOSTA’s impact on online speech and
its practical effects on sex trafficking, one might wonder how this law came
into being at all. In approaching this question, this Note adds to the growing
scholarly conversation around FOSTA by situating it at the intersection of
First Amendment doctrine and feminist legal scholarship. FOSTA is part of
a legacy of attempts by activists and lawmakers to enact laws with seemingly
feminist or otherwise protective aims that violate the First Amendment.28 But
like its predecessors, FOSTA fails to achieve its primary goals because it
enacts content-restrictive provisions, the burden of which falls largely on
already vulnerable groups. In this case, those vulnerable groups include sextrafficking survivors and consensual sex workers—a group consisting
mostly of women, low-income individuals, people of color, and members of
the LGBTQ community.29
Part I explores some of the relevant First Amendment doctrine, focusing
on previous examples of failed content-based speech restrictions. Part II then
describes how FOSTA came to be and the ongoing litigation that may be its
undoing. After Part II concludes that FOSTA, although well intentioned, is
both unconstitutional and unwise, Part III proposes the creation of a common
fund for survivors of sex trafficking. This solution prioritizes the well-being
of survivors without sacrificing free-speech rights or further harming already
marginalized groups. Survivors, sex workers, speech advocates, and society
at large all deserve better than FOSTA. By focusing on how law can best
help victims, rather than how it can punish offenders, it is possible to
conceive a constitutional alternative that furthers feminist goals.

Watch’s concern that their online decriminalization advocacy efforts would be seen as facilitating
prostitution).
27 See Complaint, supra note 10, ¶¶ 102–20 (discussing FOSTA’s potential censorship of online
resources for sex workers and trafficking victims); McCombs, supra note 17 (describing the loss of online
resources for many sex workers, pushing them into dangerous conditions on the streets).
28 See infra Section I.C.
29 See David Eichert, “It Ruined My Life”: FOSTA, Male Escorts, and the Construction of Sexual
Victimhood in American Politics, 26 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 201, 217–18, 244 (2019) (describing the
prevalence of gay men in sex work and noting the need for further research in particular to address the
needs of nonbinary and genderqueer sex workers); Jackson & Heineman, supra note 21, at 75 (discussing
the disproportionate effect that prohibition of sex work has on low-income and other marginalized
populations); Lura Chamberlain, Note, FOSTA: A Hostile Law with a Human Cost, 87 FORDHAM L. REV.
2171, 2210–11 (2019) (describing “at-risk” populations for sex trafficking, including lower-income,
undereducated, and (often younger) LGBTQ people); Grant, supra note 15 (noting the impact of FOSTA
on vulnerable groups of sex workers).
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BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES: THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE
FEMINIST PROJECT IN CONFLICT

FOSTA and its flaws sit at the intersection of First Amendment doctrine
and feminist jurisprudence. This Part thus briefly explores these two areas of
law to help clarify how FOSTA fits into the existing legal landscape. It
begins by describing a few relevant First Amendment doctrines that hint at
FOSTA’s potential downfall. Next, it explores the goals and pitfalls of
feminist legislation, specifically legislation arising from the anti-rape and
anti-pornography movements. Finally, this Part illustrates the conflict that
developed between First Amendment doctrine and protective legislation. In
such conflicts, First Amendment principles triumphed.30
A. A First Amendment Primer
At its core, the First Amendment prohibits Congress from enacting laws
that infringe on the public’s freedom of speech.31 Although the plain text of
the Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech,”32 the Supreme Court has never interpreted this as an
absolute bar on all restrictions potentially affecting speech.33 The Supreme
Court has, however, embraced a wider scope of speech as constitutionally
protected over time. The trend toward increased speech protection began in
the early to mid-twentieth century34 and has persisted in recent years.35
Commercial speech, for example, moved from a lower tier to a higher level
of protection throughout the end of the twentieth and early twenty-first
centuries.36 Of course, First Amendment jurisprudence is a nuanced and ever-

See, e.g., Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 325 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d, 475 U.S.
1001 (1986).
31 U.S. CONST. amend. I. Although not relevant for the purposes of this Note, the First Amendment
has also been incorporated to apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (assuming that the First Amendment’s prohibitions on restrictions of the
freedom of speech and of the press apply to protect against laws by state governments through the
Fourteenth Amendment).
32 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
33 See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–69 (2010) (noting that historically the First
Amendment has not prohibited laws against defamation, fraud, obscenity, or certain speech integral to or
inciting imminent criminality).
34 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (explaining that “[t]here
may be a narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears
on its face” to implicate individual rights, such as free speech).
35 See Joel M. Gora, Free Speech Matters: The Roberts Court and the First Amendment, 25 J.L. &
POL’Y 63, 65 (2016) (arguing that the Roberts Court has “created a sort of free speech ‘Camelot’”).
36 See Troy L. Booher, Scrutinizing Commercial Speech, 15 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 69, 71–72
(2004) (describing the Court’s increasing protection of commercial speech).
30
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evolving area of law, the full contours of which lie beyond the scope of this
Note.37
Two key First Amendment principles are particularly relevant for this
Note: (1) a given statute cannot be overbroad in its restriction of speech,38
and (2) where the government regulates the content of speech—as opposed
to its time, place, or manner—the regulation is almost certainly invalid.39
These are the attacks leveled at FOSTA, and they are also the kind of attacks
that have successfully invalidated other legislation promoted by feminists in
the past.40
1. Overbreadth
A regulation of speech is overbroad if it reaches a significant portion of
speech that is protected by the First Amendment.41 Thus, even if the
regulation at issue only intends to target a narrow category of unlawful
speech, to the extent it can be construed as reaching protected speech, it will
fall victim to the overbreadth doctrine. This overbreadth doctrine therefore
provides a lower threshold for First Amendment challenges than challenges
based on other constitutional provisions,42 largely because of concerns about
the chilling effect such regulations have on speech.43 Even if a statute does
not directly target constitutionally protected speech and might not be
enforced to abridge it, if people fear that it will, they will be less likely to

37 See generally Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE
L.J. 877, 877 (1963) (describing First Amendment doctrine as confusing and “unsatisfactory”). See also
Jane R. Bambauer & Derek E. Bambauer, Information Libertarianism, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 335, 338–39
(2017) (noting that many scholars today critique First Amendment jurisprudence as “bereft of principle”).
38 See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002) (finding that a regulation of online
speech was overly broad based on its impact on constitutionally protected speech).
39 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (noting that time, place, and manner
restrictions may be constitutional so long as they do not impermissibly target speech’s content, are
justified by a significant state interest, and provide alternative speech mechanisms).
40 See infra Section I.C.
41 Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 244.
42 See Anna Windemuth, The First Challenge to FOSTA Was Dismissed—Along with the First
Amendment’s Unique Standing Doctrine, MEDIA FREEDOM & INFO. ACCESS CLINIC (Dec. 27, 2018),
https://law.yale.edu/mfia/case-disclosed/first-challenge-fosta-was-dismissed-along-first-amendmentsunique-standing-doctrine [https://perma.cc/9X39-3F6B].
43 See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1972) (“[G]overnmental action may be subject to
constitutional challenge even though it has only an indirect effect on the exercise of First Amendment
rights.”).
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speak, thus chilling speech.44 As such, if the Court construes a statute as
overbroad on its face, it will invalidate it.45
To compound the far-reaching effect of the overbreadth doctrine, the
Supreme Court embraces a broad scope of speech within First Amendment
protection.46 Indeed, the Court has only established a few categorically
unprotected forms of speech.47 Some scholars have advocated for
interpreting the First Amendment to encompass only political speech or
speech that conveys something of scientific, literary, artistic, or educational
value.48 Yet the Court has continuously reaffirmed that speech need not have
any political, artistic, educational, or scientific value to be protected by the
First Amendment.49 Further, the government cannot escape invalidation of a
regulation by promising not to enforce it to the fullest possible extent; this
does nothing to negate the overly broad reach of statute’s text, which is what
is at issue in an overbreadth challenge.50 The overbreadth doctrine, then, is
one potent weapon against speech regulations.
2. Content-Based Restrictions and Exceptions
A content-based regulation is one where the government seeks to
prohibit speech based on what the speaker is saying.51 For example, a law
that prohibits discussing the President would be content-discriminatory.52
Content-based restrictions are presumed invalid and thus subject to strict
44

See Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent, and the Chilling Effect, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1633, 1637
(2013) (describing how people may be afraid to engage in protected speech if they are uncertain about
whether it is criminalized).
45 See, e.g., Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 256 (invalidating portions of the Child Pornography
Prevention Act as overbroad on their face).
46 See Gora, supra note 35, at 65; see also Robert L. Kerr, Can Postmodernist Analysis Better Explain
the First Amendment Jurisprudence of the Roberts Court?, 4 U. BALT. J. MEDIA L. & ETHICS 1, 7–8
(2014) (arguing that the Roberts Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence is eclectic and notable for
including speech as constitutionally protected where scholars had argued it likely would not do so).
47 These include obscenity, defamation, fraud, speech that is “integral to criminal conduct,” and
speech that incites imminent criminal conduct. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–69 (2010).
48 See Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Theory of Low-Value Speech, 48 SMU L. REV. 297, 333–39 (1995)
(describing scholarly debate on whether the Court should distinguish between “high-value” and “lowvalue” speech).
49 See id. at 338 (describing the Supreme Court’s affirmation of “equality of expression”); Stevens,
559 U.S. at 479–80.
50 Stevens, 559 U.S. at 480–81.
51 See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 722–23 (2000) (describing “viewpoint-based regulation[s]”
and “regulation of the subject matter of messages” as constitutionally “objectionable form[s] of contentbased regulation”).
52 See id. at 723 n.31 (“The First Amendment's hostility to content-based regulation extends not only
to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic.”
(citations omitted)).
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scrutiny.53 To survive strict scrutiny and overcome this presumption, the
government must show the restriction is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling government interest.54 That is, the law must use the “least
restrictive means” to advance an important governmental goal to avoid
chilling constitutionally protected speech.55 The test for content
discrimination therefore overlaps with the overbreadth doctrine where both
rules disfavor regulations that touch upon too much protected speech, which
includes the vast majority of speech. Notably, this presumption of invalidity
becomes even stronger when the content-based restriction appears to
discriminate against specific viewpoints.56 Returning to the earlier example,
a law specifically prohibiting speech critical of the President would almost
certainly be unconstitutional.57
Historically, however, the Supreme Court has allowed content-based
regulation of a few unprotected areas of speech, including libel, fighting
words, obscenity, incitement, and speech integral to carrying out a crime.58
These exceptions have been clarified and narrowed over time.59 With respect
to obscenity, for example, the Court in Reno v. ACLU60 invalidated two
provisions of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) on First Amendment
grounds using the strict scrutiny standard.61 Although the Court found the

53

See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997).
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 261, 263 (2002) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
55 See Reno, 521 U.S. at 874 (a burden on speech “is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives
would be at least as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose” of the statute).
56 See Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 330–34 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d, 475 U.S. 1001
(1986). In an opinion affirmed by the Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals struck down
an anti-pornography statute based on its viewpoint discrimination. The court specifically found that the
legislation, which prohibited degrading depictions of women, constituted impermissible viewpoint
discrimination by attempting to impose a nonmisogynistic mindset on pornographers and viewers. Id.
57 See Hill, 530 U.S. at 711 (a state’s regulation may not favor one point of view over another). Of
course, that the Court itself has not always agreed on what constitutes a content-based restriction
somewhat complicates this analysis. See, e.g., id. at 743–44 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that a
regulation becomes an impermissible content-based restriction based on its greater context; Justice Scalia
would have held a regulation on demonstrations outside of abortion clinics unconstitutional because the
context of such a regulation indicates that it necessarily targets anti-abortion protests).
58 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 427–28 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment) (describing categories of unprotected and less-protected speech); Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15, 24–25 (1973) (setting out a three-part test for qualifying speech as obscene and therefore unprotected);
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949) (finding that the First Amendment does
not protect speech “used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute”).
59 See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 428 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that the categorical
exclusions from complete protection have narrowed over time).
60 521 U.S. 844.
61 Id.
54

512

115:503 (2020)

On FOSTA and the Failures of Punitive Speech Restrictions

CDA’s prohibition on transmitting “obscene” materials to minors valid,62 it
found prohibitions on transmitting “indecent” and “patently offensive”
materials too expansive to withstand strict scrutiny.63 It did not matter that
this legislation was intentionally modeled after the Supreme Court’s own
obscenity test, which allows regulation of works designed to “appeal to the
‘prurient’ interest” in sex, lacking “serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value,” and depicting explicit sexual conduct in a way that is
“patently offensive.”64
Another First Amendment exception relevant to FOSTA is speech
integral to criminal conduct, which the Court has construed particularly
narrowly.65 Speech falls into this category when it is inextricably intertwined
with criminal conduct such that the two feed into each other.66 Child
pornography is one example: pornographic pictures of children are
unprotected speech because they can only be obtained through criminal child
sexual abuse.67 As such, laws prohibiting child pornography do not violate
the First Amendment.
A related category of unprotected speech is incitement of imminent
lawless action.68 States and the federal government may impose restrictions
on preparations for actual, imminent criminal conduct, including speech.69
As an example, laws against soliciting child pornography fall under this
exception because selling and purchasing—although commercial speech—
imminently incite the crimes of making, possessing, or distributing child
pornography.70 In contrast, speech that merely advocates lawbreaking but
does not directly advance a criminal act is not within this narrow exception.71

62

Id. at 883.
Id. at 874, 885.
64 Id. at 873; see also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24–25 (1973) (delineating a three-prong test
for what constitutes obscenity).
65 See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949).
66 See id.
67 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982) (“The distribution of photographs and films
depicting sexual activity by juveniles is intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children . . . .”).
68 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1969) (per curiam) (holding advocacy for
violence is different than inciting imminent violence and thus cannot be regulated).
69 See id. at 448 (noting that advocacy for or “abstract teaching” about the moral need for violent
insurrection “is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action” (quoting
Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297–98 (1961))).
70 See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 298–99 (2008) (upholding prohibitions on the
solicitation and pandering of child pornography under Brandenburg’s incitement exception doctrine).
71 See supra Section I.C (discussing courts’ condemnation of “thought control” statutes).
63
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For example, activists may not be prohibited from advocating for violent
revolution as long as their speech is not actually inciting imminent violence.72
In sum, the First Amendment protects the vast majority of speech. But,
as the next Section explains, at the same time that the Court was expanding
the First Amendment’s reach, feminist scholars and activists were
advocating for very different legal reforms.
B. Emerging Feminist Legislation and Its Challenges
Just as the Supreme Court started broadening the First Amendment’s
purview, a burgeoning feminist movement began gaining traction in the
United States.73 It is difficult to provide a single, accurate definition of
“feminism”; although usually united by broad principles against misogyny,
the feminist movement has never been monolithic.74 Diverse factions
emerged during the 1960s and 1970s, including radical feminists who sought
to end male hegemony,75 formal-equality theorists who focused on achieving
legal equality for women,76 Marxist feminists who promoted rethinking
socialism with an eye toward gender liberation,77 womanists and Black
feminists who focused on the racism and misogyny experienced by Black
women in particular,78 and numerous others.79

See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 (“[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press
do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where
such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action.” (footnote omitted)).
73 See Rosemarie Tong, Women, Pornography, and the Law, 73 ACADEME 14, 14–16, 19–20 (1987)
(describing the growing feminist, anti-pornography, and anti-rape movements in the United States during
the 1970s and 1980s); Rebecca Benson, Note, Pornography and the First Amendment: American
Booksellers v. Hudnut, 9 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 153, 156 (1986) (describing the growing feminist antipornography movements of the 1970s).
74 See Emily L. Sherwin, The Limits of Feminism, 9 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 249, 249 (1998)
(noting that “there is no consensus about what feminism entails or even what its objective should be” but
that it has “produced a number of different responses to the question what should be done on behalf of
women”).
75
See Ellen Willis, Radical Feminism and Feminist Radicalism, in THE ESSENTIAL ELLEN WILLIS
229, 231 (Nona Willis Aronowitz ed., 1984) (describing the early radical feminist movement).
76 Sherwin, supra note 74, at 249–50.
77 See IMELDA WHELEHAN, MODERN FEMINIST THOUGHT: FROM THE SECOND WAVE TO ‘POSTFEMINISM’ 45 (1995) (describing how Marxist feminists sought to fuse class analysis with an
understanding of the patriarchal system).
78 See Patricia Hill Collins, What’s in a Name? Womanism, Black Feminism, and Beyond, 26 BLACK
SCHOLAR 9, 9–13 (1996) (describing the debate between womanism and Black feminism and the early
womanist and Black feminist movements in the United States).
79 See Loretta Kensinger, In(Quest) of Liberal Feminism, 12 HYPATIA 178, 178–80 (1997)
(describing various categories of feminist thought and critiquing the usefulness of categorizing them at
all).
72
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While different groups embraced various approaches to achieve their
goals, most relevant for the purposes of this Note were the efforts of some
feminists in promoting anti-pornography and anti-rape agendas through
legislation.80 These scholars and activists believed cultural attitudes could
not shift fast enough, so misogynistic practices needed to be criminalized to
help transform society.81 But legislation requires majority approval by
lawmakers. Thus, feminists seeking to advance legislation to improve
women’s lives found themselves in an unlikely partnership with law-andorder politicians and cultural conservatives.82 Law-and-order politics became
mainstream throughout the 1970s and 1980s and emphasized tougher
policing practices and sentencing for crimes in order to deter and obtain
retribution for criminal conduct.83 Around the same time, cultural
conservatives increasingly influenced mainstream politics through
promotion of what they saw as traditional Christian values.84 Anti-rape
feminist groups and law-and-order politicians could agree on the need to
stigmatize rape as a serious crime; anti-pornography feminists and cultural
conservatives could agree on the dangerousness of mainstream
80 The anti-pornography movement was largely associated with radical feminists, such as scholars
Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon, who saw pornography not as an expression of sexual
freedom, but as a manifestation of violence against women by men. See Catharine A. MacKinnon,
Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (1985) (characterizing
pornography as a manifestation of violent misogyny). While the anti-rape movement started out as a more
radical movement associated with left-wing politics, it gradually became more mainstream as reformers
began to see law not solely as an obstacle to reform but as a potential tool to be used in generating social
reform. See ROSE CORRIGAN, UP AGAINST A WALL: RAPE REFORM AND THE FAILURE OF SUCCESS 29–
32 (2013) (describing anti-rape activists’ shift toward utilizing legal reforms to combat rape in the United
States).
81 See Benson, supra note 73, at 155–59 (describing how and why anti-pornography feminists turned
to legislation when it became clear that extralegal interventions were not working); CORRIGAN, supra
note 80, at 31–32 (arguing that feminists began supporting legal reforms as a comprehensive approach to
social reform against rape).
82 See Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Porn in Their Words: Female Leaders in the Adult
Entertainment Industry Address Free Speech, Censorship, Feminism, Culture and the Mainstreaming of
Adult Content, 9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 255, 258–61 (2006) (comparing and describing the
Republican George W. Bush Administration’s “campaign against pornography” with Professor
MacKinnon’s feminist criticism of pornography (footnote omitted)); see also Wendy Kaminer, Feminists
Against
the
First
Amendment,
ATLANTIC
(Nov.
1992),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1992/11/feminists-against-the-first-amendment/305051
[https://perma.cc/6Ku9-7NUS] (describing the unlikely anti-pornography coalition between radical
feminists, like Professors Dworkin and MacKinnon, with conservatives, including Phyllis Schlafly and
televangelist Jerry Falwell).
83 See HEATHER SCHOENFELD, BUILDING THE PRISON STATE: RACE AND THE POLITICS OF MASS
INCARCERATION 93–96 (2018) (describing how law-and-order politics started with the Nixon
Administration and grew to new heights of popularity during the Reagan and Bush Sr. Administrations).
84 See Kaminer, supra note 82 (describing the rise of the “New Right” in the early 1980s).
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pornography.85 But despite these surface-level agreements, feminists had
very different understandings of the true causes of rape and pornography,
seeing them as societal problems relating to male hegemony. 86 Their
apparent allies—law-and-order politicians and cultural conservatives—saw
both pornography and rape more as individual moral failings deserving of
punishment.87 As a result, the legislation that developed to address these
issues was not so much pro-women—in the way feminists envisioned—as it
was pro-punishment.88
As Professor Marie Gottschalk argues, although feminists succeeded in
drawing attention to rape and domestic violence, law enforcement officials
and politicians saw these issues not as societal problems, but as criminal acts
by specific, violent individuals.89 Rather than supporting a broader antimisogyny movement, law-and-order officials adopted policies aimed at
increasing arrests and convictions of rapists and abusers.90 Feminist
organizations wanted to increase awareness of the prevalence of rape and
domestic abuse and, in doing so, gained state and federal funding to support
rape crisis centers.91 But this funding came with a catch—rape and domestic
violence victims in state-funded shelters were often required to file police
reports and comply with law enforcement officials before receiving any aid.92
Reporting requirements might seem beneficial for ending rape and
domestic violence by catching perpetrators. However, evidence indicates

85 See MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS
INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 124–26 (2006) (describing how law-and-order politicians came to support
rape-law reforms); Kaminer, supra note 82 (describing how cultural conservatives and anti-pornography
feminists agreed on pornography as something to be quashed).
86 GOTTSCHALK, supra note 85, at 122, 124–27 (describing how feminists and lawmakers differed in
their views of rape, and how ultimately lawmakers’ views predominated because feminist-led rape crisis
centers needed government funds).
87 See Kaminer, supra note 82 (describing how radical feminists opposed pornography as
discrimination against women, while cultural conservatives opposed pornography based on concerns of
“changing sexual mores and the decline of the traditional family”).
88 See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 85, at 131 (noting that “[w]omen’s groups entered into some
unsavory coalitions and compromises that bolstered the law-and-order agenda and reduced their own
capacity” to further their own feminist goals); see also Krishna de la Cruz, Comment, Exploring the
Conflicts Within Carceral Feminism: A Call to Revocalize the Women Who Continue to Suffer,
19 SCHOLAR 79, 95–96 (2016) (noting that domestic violence policies have prioritized punishing
offenders over helping domestic violence victims, the majority of which have historically been women).
89 GOTTSCHALK, supra note 85, at 128 (describing how feminists’ social movement against rape was
coopted and transformed into another part of law-and-order politicians’ war on crime).
90 See id. at 129–31.
91 Id. at 124–25 (describing how state and federal actors became involved in feminist anti-rape
movements).
92 Id. at 126.
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that reporting requirements can discourage victims from coming forward,
thus preventing them from receiving the attached aid and hindering law
enforcement.93 Victims might not report for fear of retaliation from their
attackers, or they may simply lack the economic or emotional support
necessary to endure an investigation and trial.94 Further, people from
communities disproportionately targeted by punitive policing tactics might
be extremely reluctant to turn to police at all.95 But of course, people from
these communities—particularly people of color—often found themselves
erased by the narratives feminists and lawmakers promoted. Instead,
“carceral feminist” legal reforms fed into the growing system of mass
incarceration that plundered marginalized communities.96 So, although
feminists were able to draw attention to rape and domestic violence and
stigmatize them as offenses, their efforts fell short when it came to actually
supporting victims, especially those most in need of aid.
Anti-pornography feminists faced rather different challenges in
advancing legal reforms. Feminist scholars such as Professors Andrea
Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon linked violent pornography specifically
to violence against women.97 But as with the anti-rape and domestic-violence
movements, people outside the feminist movement—specifically, the
lawmakers that would pass and members of the public that would support
anti-pornography legislation—were more inclined to see pornography as an
individual moral failing than as a widespread manifestation of misogyny.98
Although some scholars found a causal connection between viewing violent

93 See id. at 129, 160 (suggesting that reporting requirements are problematic due to their ignorance
of the plight of marginalized communities that face discriminatory treatment by police).
94 See Linda S. Williams, The Classic Rape: When Do Victims Report?, 31 SOC. PROBS. 459, 459
(1984).
95 See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 85, at 129, 160 (describing how anti-rape reformers ignored
concerns of Black women and Latinas about overly punitive practices); see also de la Cruz, supra note
88, at 98–99 (arguing that women of color and immigrant women face increased, unjustified arrest rates
and other mistreatment from police, hindering their ability to report and cooperate with law enforcement).
96 See Elizabeth Bernstein, The Sexual Politics of the “New Abolitionism,” 18 DIFFERENCES 128,
143 (2007) (describing “carceral feminism,” through which feminists achieved rape-law reform through
tapping into punitive impulses, thus contributing to mass incarceration); see also de la Cruz, supra note
88, at 80–81 (defining carceral feminism and the resultant “gender and racial discrimination in the legal
system”).
97
Benson, supra note 73, at 156–61 (describing the legislation proposed by Professors MacKinnon
and Dworkin).
98 See generally Tong, supra note 73, at 14 (describing cultural conservatives’ view of pornography
as an individual moral failing as in contrast to anti-pornography feminists’ belief that pornography is a
widespread symptom of systemic misogyny).
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pornography and sexual violence,99 feminists struggled to convince people
of the connection between pornography and misogyny.100 As a result, they
found themselves allied with cultural conservatives who opposed
pornography, not for its violence and misogyny, but for its sexual content,
which fell outside of their views of acceptable expressions of sexuality.101
Although anti-pornography legislation failed to take hold at state and
federal levels in the United States, ordinances made headway in some
cities.102 But jurisdictions that had these rules did not always enforce them
the way feminists had hoped. Specifically, enforcement targeted
pornography that fell outside mainstream views of acceptable sexual conduct
rather than works that depicted rape and violence against women.103 The
ordinances that passed in the United States were either vetoed or enjoined on
First Amendment grounds before they could be enforced,104 but in Canada,
where similar rules existed, the content most susceptible to anti-pornography
enforcement was actually erotic content geared toward the LGBTQ
community.105 This was the opposite of the result anti-pornography feminists
intended, as they viewed pornography portraying heterosexual violence by
men against women as most harmful.106 These enforcement practices
99 See Lynne Segal, Pornography and Violence: What the ‘Experts’ Really Say, 36 FEMINIST REV.
29, 29 (1990) (arguing that although there might be some evidence linking pornography and violent
attitudes, it is inconclusive).
100 See, e.g., Ellen Willis, Feminism, Moralism, and Pornography, 38 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 351, 351–
52 (1993) (criticizing the anti-pornography movement’s claims as factually incorrect and patronizing).
101
See id. at 358 (arguing that the feminist anti-porn movement began to align itself with cultural
conservatives who otherwise disavowed feminism).
102 Benson, supra note 73, at 153 n.2, 155 n.6 (noting that Indianapolis and Minneapolis passed
versions of the Dworkin and MacKinnon ordinance, and several other cities and federal lawmakers
considered but ultimately declined to adopt similar pornography regulations).
103 Compare Christopher N. Kendall, Gay Male Pornography After Little Sisters Book and Art
Emporium: A Call for Gay Male Cooperation in the Struggle for Sex Equality, 12 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J.
21, 21–24 (1997) (describing how Canada’s obscenity laws aimed at pornography were enforced
disparately against gay and lesbian pornography), with Andrea Dworkin, Against the Male Flood:
Censorship, Pornography, and Equality, 8 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 10–13 (1985) (arguing for banning
pornography as material that depicts and promotes extreme violence against women).
104 See Benson, supra note 73, at 155 n.6 (describing how an ordinance passed by a city council was
vetoed by the mayor and other proposed legislation was defeated); Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut,
771 F.2d 323, 334 (7th Cir. 1985) (affirming the district court’s injunction against and invalidation of an
anti-pornography ordinance), aff’d, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
105 See Kendall, supra note 103, at 21–24 (describing the discriminatory enforcement practices that
led to the censorship of pornography targeting gay and lesbian audiences but not pornography created to
appeal to straight men); see also Little Sisters Book & Art Emporium v. Canada, 2000 SCC 69, [2000]
2 S.C.R. 1120, paras. 112–23 (Can.) (affirming the lower court’s findings that gay and lesbian bookstores
suffered disproportionate effects from the censorship laws).
106 See, e.g., MacKinnon, supra note 80, at 16–20 (arguing against the proliferation of mainstream
pornography that depicts women as victims of sexual violence by men).
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demonstrate the problems of adopting content-restrictive measures: they are
enforced based on existing societal values and stigmas, such as those against
LGBTQ people, rather than with the mindsets of their feminist drafters.107
The ordinances also received substantial criticism from other feminist
scholars, who saw them as harmful to free speech and patronizing to
women.108
As the next Section explains, such concerns were short-lived. These
ordinances and other protective legislation premised on restricting harmful
speech soon ran headlong into the First Amendment.
C. The Pornography Cases: Protective Legislation on the Chopping Block
This Section explores some feminist-driven legislation that fell prey to
First Amendment challenges, as well as other protective legislation that,
while not explicitly feminist, was based on a similar rationale of restricting
harmful speech to protect vulnerable groups. This Section thus begins by
analyzing the invalidation of Indianapolis’s anti-pornography ordinance.
Next, it explores the invalidation of provisions of the Child Pornography
Prevention Act and the Communications Decency Act, both of which sought
to restrict harmful internet speech.
1. American Booksellers Association v. Hudnut
In 1984, Indianapolis adopted an anti-pornography ordinance based on
the one proposed by Professors Dworkin and MacKinnon.109 The ordinance
targeted pornographic pictures or texts that depicted women—or anyone
else—as “sexual objects” being humiliated, physically abused, tortured,
raped, or dominated.110 A variety of distributors and consumers of literature
and films challenged the statute as unconstitutional.111 The ordinance, they
alleged, was so overbroad as to proscribe great swaths of constitutionally

107

See Kendall, supra note 103, at 22 (noting that Professors MacKinnon and Dworkin condemned
Canada’s discriminatory practices); see also de la Cruz, supra note 88, at 98–102 (describing how laws
intended to protect women may be used against them due to law enforcement biases).
108 See, e.g., Willis, supra note 100, at 353 (critiquing the feminist anti-pornography movement);
Tong, supra note 73, at 19–20 (same).
109 Indianapolis, Ind., City-County General Ordinance No. 24 (1984); see also Benson, supra note
73, at 153 n.2 (noting the basis of the ordinance was a model law conceived by Professors Dworkin and
MacKinnon and describing surrounding scholarship and the legislative history of the law).
110 Indianapolis, Ind., City-County General Ordinance No. 24 § 16-3(v) (1984); see also Am.
Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 324 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
111 Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 771 F.2d at 326–27.

519

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

protected speech,112 even potentially censoring acclaimed literature, such as
the works of William Butler Yeats, James Joyce, D.H. Lawrence, and
Homer.113
Supporters of the ordinance stressed the connection between depictions
of violence against women and viewer attitudes, pointing to some evidence
that exposure to violent pornography promotes violent, misogynistic
attitudes.114 Although some supporters argued the ordinance’s reach was
narrower than what the plaintiffs alleged, not all found its potential inclusion
of great literature startling. As Professor MacKinnon argued, if something
depicts degradation and abuse of women, “why should it matter that the work
has other value?”115
The federal courts agreed with the plaintiffs who challenged the
ordinance. In American Booksellers v. Hudnut,116 the Seventh Circuit focused
on the fact that nearly all speech, even speech that most people find
detestable, enjoys constitutional protection.117 Obscenity, which may be
lawfully restricted, constitutes a narrow category of speech, limited to the
most sexually graphic, “patently offensive,” and otherwise valueless
content.118 Thus, any statute likely to censor content containing any artistic
or literary value exceeds obscenity’s parameters and violates the First
Amendment.119 Because the anti-pornography ordinance’s scope reached
content with at least some artistic, literary, or other value, the district court
correctly found it overbroad.120

112 See id. at 326–27 (explaining the district court’s holding that the ordinance was “vague and
overbroad” and noting that plaintiffs collectively had interests in a wide range of material that could be
affected by the ordinance).
113 Id. at 325, 327.
114 Id. at 325, 329.
115 Id. at 325 (citing MacKinnon, supra note 80, at 21).
116 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985).
117 See id. at 327–29 (describing the breadth of First Amendment protections and explaining that
“above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because
of its message [or] its ideas ” (alteration and omission in original) (quoting Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972))).
118 Id. at 324; Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24–26 (1973).
119 Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 771 F.2d at 324, 331–32; see also Miller, 413 U.S. at 26 (explaining that
“patently offensive” depictions or descriptions of sexual content may still be protected if, at a minimum,
they have “serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value”).
120
The district court held that the ordinance was overbroad. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 771 F.2d at 326.
The Seventh Circuit focused on the ordinance’s viewpoint-discriminatory nature, specifically finding the
ordinance was unconstitutional because it “discriminate[d] on the ground of the content of speech.” Id. at
325; see also id. at 328, 332. The Seventh Circuit also noted that “Indianapolis left out of its definition
any reference to literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” Id. at 331.
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The Seventh Circuit further reasoned that the ordinance’s specific
prohibition on misogynistic pornography constituted not only a contentbased restriction on speech, but also impermissible viewpoint
discrimination.121 The ordinance’s intent to address the correlation between
violent pornography and violent attitudes itself was unlawful; unpleasant
though it may be, filmmakers and erotic novelists have the constitutional
right to promote violently misogynistic content and beliefs.122
Feminist critics particularly revile this line of reasoning. Why should
hatred of women be a protected point of view under the First Amendment?123
Why would courts act in the best interest of pornographers and violent
misogynists? Certainly, such critics make strong normative arguments about
the value of restricting the promulgation of violent, misogynistic content,
and courts are not always paragons of neutrality.124 But courts have
steadfastly maintained First Amendment protections for distasteful sexual
content. As the next Section shows, this includes even lewd content
appearing to depict children.
2. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition and Reno v. ACLU
Although anti-pornography ordinances failed to gain traction, the
federal government did adopt legislation targeting pornography in other
ways. About a decade after the Indianapolis ordinance’s invalidation,
Congress passed the Child Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA).125 Although
not an explicitly feminist project like the anti-pornography ordinance, the
CPPA relied on similar logic regarding pornography’s effects on viewers’
thoughts and actions toward those depicted in it. Specifically, the CPPA
prohibited not just actual child pornography, but “virtual child pornography”
as well.126 Virtual child pornography may be created using adult actors that
121

Id. at 328, 332.
See id. at 327–32.
123 See, e.g., Morrison Torrey, Essay, Thoughts About Why the First Amendment Operates to Stifle
the Freedom and Equality of a Subordinated Majority, 21 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 25, 26, 28–31 (1999)
(describing how courts have used the First Amendment to justify allowing women to suffer harms in
order to avoid harms to free speech in society at large, particularly protecting speech primarily used by
men).
124 See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2446–47 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing
that majority decisions have favored religious neutrality for Christians, as in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd.
v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, but not for Muslims under President Trump’s travel ban).
125 Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-26 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A, 2256), invalidated in part by Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S.
234 (2002).
126 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (defining “child pornography” to include a “computer-generated image or
picture” that “appears to be” or “conveys the impression that the material is . . . of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct”).
122
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pretend to be minors or using completely computer-generated images.127 Like
the proponents of Indianapolis’s ordinance, the lawmakers behind the CPPA
believed that cutting off access to material depicting sexual abuse of
children—even if it did not actually show any real children—would decrease
incidents of child sexual abuse and real child pornography.128 Just as antipornography activists argued that violent, misogynistic pornography stoked
violent attitudes toward women, lawmakers thought that images of virtual
child pornography could transform otherwise nondangerous viewers into
full-fledged pedophiles with “appetites” for real child pornography.129
As controversial as adult pornography is, child pornography is
universally condemned. The Supreme Court has gone so far as to hold that
it is inextricably linked to child sexual abuse and thus completely excluded
from First Amendment protection.130 As such, lawmakers believed that even
though the CPPA’s virtual child-pornography ban went a step beyond actual
child pornography, it would nonetheless pass constitutional muster.131 It did
not.
In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, various producers and distributers
of erotic literature and film challenged the CPPA’s ban on virtual child
pornography under the First Amendment.132 They pointed to numerous works
of literature and film that could be censored as a result of the law, including
Romeo and Juliet and the Oscar-winning films American Beauty and
Traffic.133 Although the district court found these arguments unpersuasive,
the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court found the CPPA provisions
overbroad on their face.134 The provisions swept far too much
constitutionally protected speech within their grasp, and the Supreme Court
thus affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s holding.135
Moreover, the Supreme Court, like the Seventh Circuit in American
Booksellers, expressed concerns over the legislation’s attempt to influence
127

See Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 241–42 (describing what constituted virtual child pornography
under the CPPA).
128 Id.
129 Id. at 241, 253.
130 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763–64 (1982) (classifying child pornography as
unprotected speech).
131 See Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub L. No. 104-208, § 121(1), 110 Stat. 300926, -27 (congressional findings regarding the problems with actual and virtual child pornography).
132 535 U.S. at 243.
133 Id. at 247–48.
134 Id. at 243–44, 256.
135 See id. at 240, 256 (finding that the CPPA went beyond the compelling interest of preventing
child sexual abuse as articulated in Ferber and abridged a “substantial amount of lawful speech”).
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thought and behavior.136 Violent, misogynistic daydreams and perverse
thoughts about children are still merely thoughts and therefore beyond
government control.137 The legislature may only proscribe speech that is
integral to or directly incites criminal deeds, not speech that advocates for or
imagines criminal behavior.138
The Court’s holding in this case disturbed politicians and advocates,
who saw a correlation between the proliferation of virtual child pornography
and the demand for actual child pornography.139 But the decision was
consistent with the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.140 The Court had
narrowly cabined the parameters of unprotected speech,141 and the CPPA’s
provisions went beyond those parameters. Like the Indianapolis ordinance,
it could not stand, no matter the good intentions of its legislators.
Similarly, in Reno v. ACLU,142 the Supreme Court invalidated
provisions of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) that proscribed the
“indecent transmission” of sexually graphic and “patently offensive” images
to minors over the internet.143 Like the Indianapolis ordinance and the CPPA,
several CDA provisions sought to restrict the dissemination of harmful

136 Id. at 253; Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 328 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d, 475 U.S.
1001 (1986).
137 See Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 771 F.2d at 330 (“Racial bigotry, anti-semitism, violence on
television, reporters’ biases—these and many more influence the culture and shape our socialization . . . .
[A]ll is protected as speech, however insidious.”); see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–76
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“[I]t is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination . . . .
[The Framers] eschewed silence coerced by law—the argument of force in its worst form.”).
138 See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 376 (seeking to prohibit beliefs is not a valid way to reduce crime). But
see United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 299 (2008) (upholding prohibiting pandering or soliciting
child pornography under the incitement exception); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761–62 (1982)
(noting that advertising and selling child pornography are integral to producing illegal materials).
139 See Sara C. Marcy, Banning Virtual Child Pornography: Is There Any Way Around Ashcroft v.
Free Speech Coalition?, 81 N.C. L. REV. 2136, 2147–48 (2003) (describing how lawmakers responded
to Free Speech Coalition by “attempting to strengthen the connection between virtual child pornography
and harm to actual children”).
140 Gora, supra note 35, at 75–80 (arguing that the Roberts Court has rightfully broadened free speech
protections).
141 See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761–64 (describing child pornography as integral to criminal conduct and
unprotected due to its lack of any legitimate value); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969)
(per curiam) (distinguishing advocacy for violence from actual incitement to violence and protecting the
former from government regulation).
142 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
143 Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133 (codified as amended
at 47 U.S.C. § 223), invalidated in part by Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
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imagery to an influential audience, specifically children.144 But the Supreme
Court reasoned that no matter the statute’s intentions, it was overbroad
because it was not narrowly tailored to only apply to obscene material.145
Even though this CDA provision was modeled after the Supreme Court’s
test, which described obscenity as content specifically designed to appeal to
“the prurient interest,” features “patently offensive” sexual conduct, and
otherwise lacks any other value, the provision was still not narrow enough.146
That is, material can technically be offensive and violently or sexually
graphic without being utterly valueless and obscene, and thus, unprotected.
So, the Court struck down the CDA provisions.147
The Indianapolis ordinance, the CPPA’s ban on virtual child
pornography, and the CDA’s prohibition on transmitting graphic material to
minors were based on similar logic: images and descriptions of graphic
sexual content damage viewers, leading them down paths of sexual depravity
or violence that feminists, law-and-order politicians, and cultural
conservatives condemned for their own reasons.148 But the First Amendment
proscribes legislation premised on controlling thoughts, even if those
thoughts tend toward criminality. Thus, the coalition of feminists, cultural
conservatives, and lawmakers lost the battle against pornography.
Nevertheless, this coalition would go on to take up arms once again against
a new societal ill, creating legislation farther away from the old “thought
control” model, but still rooted in restricting content. As the next Part argues,
this is how FOSTA came to be.
II. FOSTA IN CONTEXT AND IN COURT
This Part describes FOSTA’s origins and the ongoing litigation against
it. First, it explores § 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) and
courts’ generous interpretation of it, which allowed online service providers
to avoid liability for profiting from online sex trafficking. Second, it
144 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(B)(ii) (prohibiting the knowing transmission of obscene materials or child
pornography to minors using a telecommunications device); id. § 223(d) (prohibiting knowingly
transmitting patently offensive material over the internet to minors).
145 Reno, 521 U.S. at 873–74 (finding the statute exceeded the narrow confines of unprotected
obscenity).
146 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
147 Reno, 521 U.S. at 873–74.
148
See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 85, at 124–26 (describing how feminists saw rape and domestic
violence as widespread social issues while lawmakers focused on them as individual crimes); Kaminer,
supra note 82 (explaining how radical feminists opposed pornography as discrimination against women,
while cultural conservatives opposed pornography based on concerns of “changing sexual mores and the
decline of the traditional family”).
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describes FOSTA’s immediate impact on sex workers, advocates, freespeech proponents, and sex-trafficking survivors. Finally, it assesses
FOSTA’s defensibility under the First Amendment, concluding that FOSTA
is unwise and likely unconstitutional.
A. FOSTA’s Origins: Section 230 and the Backpage Investigation
Reno v. ACLU was not the only significant case dealing with the CDA.
While the Supreme Court invalidated CDA provisions that penalized the
knowing transmission or display of “indecent” or “patently offensive”
materials to minors,149 another provision, § 230, shielded internet service
providers from liability for unlawful conduct committed by its users.150 The
catalyst for § 230 was Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.,151
wherein a New York state court found an online service provider liable for
defamation claims arising from content posted by a third party on its
website.152 Lawmakers feared that such cases would hamper the development
of the internet—online service providers would either excessively censor
user content or not get into the internet business at all if they thought they
might be liable for someone else’s unlawful conduct.153 Section 230 thus
promoted the public’s interest in the free exchange of ideas by shielding
online service providers from punishment for their users’ misdeeds.
Although § 230 originally emphasized the need for “good-faith”
monitoring by online service providers to protect unwitting users from
graphic sexual or violent content, courts interpreted it as an all-inclusive safe
harbor.154 Courts held that § 230 provided broad immunity for all providers
that were merely distributing third-party content rather than creating content

149

Reno, 521 U.S. at 844.
See generally Andrew P. Bolson, Flawed but Fixable: Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act at 20, 42 RUTGERS COMPUT. & TECH. L.J. 1, 1, 8 (2016) (describing the purposes of § 230
of the CDA, including shielding internet service providers from liability).
151 No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), superseded by statute, 47 U.S.C.
§ 230, as recognized in Shiamili v. Real Est. Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1011 (N.Y. 2011).
152 Id.; see Bolson, supra note 150, at 3–6 (describing how § 230 functioned as a response to Stratton
Oakmont).
153 Bolson, supra note 150, at 6–8.
154
47 U.S.C. § 230(c); see also id. § 230(b)(3)–(5) (describing Congress’s intent to incentivize
development of filtering and other technologies to protect children from exposure to inappropriate
materials); see also Mary Graw Leary, The Indecency and Injustice of Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 553, 563–64 (2018) (describing how § 230 was intended to
provide limited immunity for internet service providers).
150
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themselves.155 Although most of these initial cases dealt with defamation,156
courts later interpreted the statute to provide broad immunity against other
claims as well.157 Eventually, a line of cases established online service
providers as immune from claims regarding the advertisement of sex
trafficking and child sexual exploitation on their sites.158 These cases and
their unsettling results captured the attention of feminists, antitrafficking
activists, and eventually lawmakers.
In Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC,159 for example, the minor
plaintiffs brought state and federal law claims against Backpage for hosting
posts advertising them for commercial sex.160 The First Circuit upheld a grant
of summary judgment in favor of the defendant Backpage, a website
infamous for allowing advertisements for commercial sex, including those
posted by traffickers.161 The First Circuit followed the logic of courts around
the country, interpreting § 230 to provide broad immunity for online service
providers and emphasizing congressional intent to protect providers and

155

See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that the defendant
online service provider could not be liable for exercising “a publisher’s traditional editorial functions”
under § 230 where it failed to remove defamatory content in a timely manner); Doe v. Am. Online, Inc.,
718 So. 2d 385 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (finding that § 230 preempted state civil law claims against the
defendant and that holding it liable would be contrary to Congress’s stated intent of promoting internet
development). But see Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164–65 (9th Cir. 2008)
(holding that Roommates.com could be liable under § 230 where it functioned as a content provider by
requiring users to enter information into the site which illegally discriminated based on race, sexual
orientation, and other factors).
156 See, e.g., Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331 (holding defendant service provider not liable in a defamation
case); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998) (granting AOL’s motion for summary
judgment in a defamation case based on § 230); see also Leary, supra note 154, at 576 (“[C]ase law was
built on this idea of broad immunity, derived frequently from defamation cases.”).
157 See Leary, supra note 154, at 573 (noting that § 230 can be held to protect websites from claims
related to stalking and nonconsensual pornography); id. at 575 (describing § 230 immunity for online
service providers against claims of distributing child pornography); id. at 576 & n.113.
158 See id. at 578–82; see also Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016)
(holding sex-trafficking survivors could not hold Backpage owners civilly liable for profiting from
exploitative advertisements of them as minors posted on their website); see also Backpage.com, LLC v.
Dart, 807 F.3d 229 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding Cook County Sheriff could not target credit card companies
doing business with Backpage in order to prevent it from coordinating commercial sex transactions).
159 817 F.3d 12.
160 Id. at 16. These claims included violations of federal law, specifically the Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), which provides a civil remedy for victims of trafficking against
traffickers, and copyright laws prohibiting the unauthorized use of one’s photograph, as well as state law
claims for human trafficking, unfair and deceptive trade practices by Backpage, and unauthorized use of
personal images by Backpage for commercial gain. Id. at 17, 28.
161 See id. at 29.
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avoid chilling internet speech.162 The court further emphasized that it was a
job for Congress—not courts—to change § 230 so that sex-trafficking
survivors like the plaintiffs could recover against Backpage.163
Bolstered by a coalition of feminists, religious leaders, and law-andorder politicians,164 Congress took heed. The Senate Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations began examining online sex trafficking in
2015, specifically targeting Backpage and its hosting of sex-traffickingrelated advertisements.165 In 2017, the committee made a formal report of its
findings: Backpage’s moderators had edited ads hinting at commercial sex
with minors by removing banned words to allow the ads to stay up.166 This
active editing actually fell outside of § 230’s protection for merely
publishing third-party content, so federal officials seized Backpage and shut
it down.167
Despite the victory against Backpage, Congress decided to tighten
§ 230’s protections to deter future online service providers from engaging in
these tactics in an attempt to escape civil or criminal liability.168 The FOSTA

162

Id. at 23; see also Leary, supra note 154, at 575–77 (describing the rise of § 230 immunity for
websites that allowed sex-trafficking advertisements).
163 See Jane Doe No. 1, 817 F.3d at 22–23, 29.
164 See Melissa Gira Grant, Beyond Strange Bedfellows: How the “War on Trafficking” Was Made
to Unite the Left and Right, PUB. EYE, http://feature.politicalresearch.org/beyond-strange-bedfellows
[https://perma.cc/5S94-4AGK] (describing how lawmakers were influenced by antitrafficking activists
from all along the political spectrum in enacting FOSTA); see also Bernstein, supra note 96 (describing
the alliance between evangelicals, conservative lawmakers, and feminists in the antitrafficking movement
in the years prior to FOSTA).
165 See Jonathan O’Connell & Tom Jackman, Members of Congress Press Sessions to Investigate
Sexual
Ads
at
Backpage.com,
WASH.
POST
(July
13,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/congresswomen-press-sessions-to-investigatesexual-ads-at-backpagecom/2017/07/13/99ebaed8-6752-11e7-992822d00a47778f_story.html?utm_term=.f5078bf8f64c [https://perma.cc/62B7-56FG].
166 U.S. SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, BACKPAGE.COM’S KNOWING
FACILITATION
OF
ONLINE
SEX
TRAFFICKING
16–21
(2017),
https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Backpage%20Report%202017.01.10%20FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N3Y7-HMNF] [hereinafter SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT].
167 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Leads Efforts to Seize Backpage.com, the
Internet’s Leading Forum for Prostitution Ads, and Obtains 93-Count Federal Indictment (Apr. 9, 2018)
[hereinafter
Justice
Department
Leads
Efforts
to
Seize
Backpage.com],
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-leads-effort-seize-backpagecom-internet-s-leadingforum-prostitution-ads [https://perma.cc/G7KG-SX5V] (describing Backpage’s seizure by federal law
enforcement officials for facilitating prostitution).
168 FOSTA, Pub. L. 115-164, sec. 2, § 230, 132 Stat. 1253, 1253 (2018); see also Tom Jackman,
House Committee Targets Online Sex Trafficking by Amending Mann Act, Puzzling Advocates, WASH.
POST
(Dec.
12,
2017,
5:21
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/truecrime/wp/2017/12/12/house-committee-targets-online-sex-trafficking-by-amending-mann-act-puzzling-
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package passed both the House and the Senate with overwhelming bipartisan
support,169 and President Trump signed the bill into law on April 11, 2018.170
As discussed above, FOSTA amends § 230 to clarify that it does not shield
websites that promote or facilitate prostitution or that act with reckless
disregard for sex trafficking by allowing advertisements for “unlawful sex
acts.”171 It further amends the Mann Act, an existing anti-prostitution law, to
provide a right of civil recovery and restitution against internet service
providers that promote or facilitate prostitution or recklessly disregard sex
trafficking.172 Despite this apparent bipartisan victory for sex-trafficking
survivors, who would ostensibly now be able to hold internet service
providers that facilitated their exploitation accountable, public reactions to
FOSTA were not uniformly positive.
B. FOSTA’s Reality
Although some sex trafficking survivors and advocates hailed FOSTA
as a critical step toward achieving justice for survivors and ending sex
trafficking,173 others expressed reservations as to its scope and likely
success.174 Tech companies and free-speech groups spoke out against
FOSTA, arguing that it unduly abridges First Amendment rights.175 Sex
workers and decriminalization activists also opposed FOSTA’s apparent
restrictions on internet speech, arguing that FOSTA would limit their
political speech by penalizing the promotion or facilitation of prostitution.176
As a preliminary matter, FOSTA’s focus on “advertising” does little to
assuage these fears; the rest of the Act’s broad language clarifies that, while
advocates/?utm_term=.12029d169876 [https://perma.cc/84TQ-7JWD] (describing Congress’s attempts
to hold websites like Backpage accountable and part of the process of creating FOSTA).
169 See H.R. 1865—Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017,
CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/1865/allactions?overview=closed&q=%7B%22roll-call-vote%22%3A%22all%22%7D [https://perma.cc/ZU8TS255].
170 FOSTA; Romano, supra note 1.
171 FOSTA, sec. 2, § 230.
172 Id. sec. 3, § 2421A.
173 See, e.g., World Without Exploitation, supra note 2.
174 See Grant, supra note 15 (describing various sex-trafficking survivor–advocates’ views opposing
FOSTA based on its targeting of prostitution and sex work and its lack of support for victims outside of
allowing for civil litigation).
175 See Citron & Jurecic, supra note 5; see also Note, Section 230 as First Amendment Rule,
131 HARV. L. REV. 2027, 2028 (2018) (arguing that § 230 is necessary for fulfilling free-speech values
and should be part of the First Amendment rule).
176 See Complaint, supra note 10, ¶¶ 76, 91 (describing Woodhull Freedom Foundation’s and Human
Rights Watch’s fears that their political activities advocating for decriminalizing sex work, but not sex
trafficking, will render them liable under § 230).
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Congress was particularly concerned with sex-trafficking ads, websites that
otherwise promote or facilitate prostitution or simply fail to prevent third
parties from using their website for trafficking are likewise subject to civil
and criminal liability.177 The Woodhull Freedom Foundation, a human rights
group that emphasizes sexual freedom, opposed FOSTA early on, fearing
that its online advertisements about a conference featuring speakers
advocating for decriminalizing sex work would render it liable under
FOSTA.178 Essentially, Woodhull and other advocates have feared that
FOSTA’s provisions hamper all sex- and sex-work-related speech in
violation of the First Amendment.179
Although FOSTA has not yet been enforced against advocates, it has
incentivized online service providers to restrict perfectly legal speech on
their platforms.180 For example, in December 2018, Tumblr, a popular
blogging platform, banned “adult content” in an effort to avoid scrutiny for
its users’ sex-related posts.181 Its goal was legitimate and certainly warranted
based on Tumblr’s continuous issues in ridding its site of illegal child
pornography and other distasteful fare.182 Unfortunately, the algorithms that
the site used to execute this mission incorrectly identified countless innocent
posts as pornographic, including art, images of political protests, and utterly
innocuous images of fully clothed women.183 A private company like Tumblr
may lawfully limit the content it hosts, and it has no duty to do so
competently. Still, this provides one example of the kind of speech harms
that FOSTA’s critics fear. To those concerned with FOSTA’s long-term
177

See FOSTA, sec. 2, § 230 (amending § 230 to clarify that websites could not escape liability for
sex-trafficking advertisements posted by their users); id. sec. 3, § 2421A (amending the Mann Act to
provide for civil and criminal liability for websites that violate the Act’s terms).
178 Complaint, supra note 10, ¶¶ 64–78.
179 See id. ¶¶ 1–2.
180 See id. ¶¶ 52–60 (describing FOSTA’s immediate impact on online speech).
181 See Shannon Liao, Tumblr Will Ban All Adult Content on December 17th, VERGE (Dec. 3, 2018,
12:26
PM),
https://www.theverge.com/2018/12/3/18123752/tumblr-adult-content-porn-ban-dateexplicit-changes-why-safe-mode [https://perma.cc/B5WB-6V8Y]; Paris Martineau, Tumblr’s Porn Ban
Reveals Who Controls What We See Online, WIRED (Dec. 4, 2018, 2:07 PM),
https://www.wired.com/story/tumblrs-porn-ban-reveals-controls-we-see-online [https://perma.cc/R8JTXRNM] (linking Tumblr’s decision to ban adult content, and similar patterns followed by other websites
like Craigslist and Patreon, to FOSTA).
182 Liao, supra note 181.
183 See Martineau, supra note 181 (describing problems with Tumblr’s flagging system that included
photos of Jesus Christ, patents for shoes, landscape drawings, and other innocent content); see also
Kaitlyn Tiffany, Tumblr’s First Year Without Porn, ATLANTIC (Dec. 3, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/12/tumblr-year-review-2019-nsfw-banmemes/602911 [https://perma.cc/A46F-EZ37] (noting that the adult-content ban “scared users away who
might actually have been fine, and it still didn’t kill the porn bots and spammy ads”).
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impact, such restrictions herald the beginning of the end for “the internet as
we know it” by discouraging speech that is outside community norms but
nonetheless constitutionally protected.184
Sex workers and advocates have also argued that FOSTA harms both
sex workers and sex-trafficking victims by conflating voluntary sex work
and sex trafficking.185 FOSTA’s provisions that equate consensual
prostitution with coerced sex trafficking, providing liability for websites that
facilitate either, led various websites to shut down portions of their site used
by voluntary sex workers to exchange information about free health services
and dangerous clients and pimps.186 This, in turn, forced sex workers to return
to the streets to market their services, where they are much more likely to
encounter violence.187 Similarly, rather than putting sex traffickers out of
business, some evidence shows that FOSTA only drove them further
underground, making it harder to apprehend traffickers and save victims.188
Additionally, FOSTA’s conflation of sex work and sex trafficking is
part of an ongoing trend that discourages sex-trafficking survivors from
coming forward for fear of being treated as criminals rather than victims.189
This seems especially likely given that many sex-trafficking survivors report
consenting to some acts at the beginning of their relationship with a
trafficker, who may start out by “grooming” victims and acting like a
184

See Khan, supra note †; Romano, supra note 1.
See McCombs, supra note 17; see also Grant, supra note 15 (noting the argument by some
antitrafficking advocates to employ a rights-based response that differentiates between trafficking and
sex work, a perspective that has been eroded by policies that link the two).
186 See McCombs, supra note 17; Complaint, supra note 10, ¶¶ 105–15 (describing one activist’s
fear that her website providing resources to sex workers and sex-trafficking survivors could lead her to
be held liable, and the concern that without this information, sex workers and trafficking survivors will
lack access to helpful resources and information pertaining to their safety).
187 See McCombs, supra note 17; Anderson et al., supra note 20 (describing increased violence
against and arrests of sex workers since FOSTA’s passage).
188 See Anderson et al., supra note 20; see also Jordan Fischer, Running Blind: IMPD Arrests First
Suspected Pimp in 7 Months, INDY CHANNEL (Dec. 12, 2018, 10:40 AM),
https://www.theindychannel.com/longform/running-blind-impd-arrests-first-suspected-pimp-in-7months [https://perma.cc/JX4H-NQLM] (describing how the absence of Backpage or other sources of
online advertising for sex work has dried up police information on sex traffickers and pimps); see also
Eichert, supra note 29, at 208 (describing how sex traffickers have either moved offline or to platforms
hosted on servers in foreign countries that do not cooperate with U.S. law enforcement).
189 See Kate DeCou, U.S. Social Policy on Prostitution: Whose Welfare Is Served?, 24 NEW ENG. J.
ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 427, 438–39 (1998) (describing how women engaged in sex work are
often criminalized while purchasers of sex work, typically men, are not); see also Elizabeth Kaigh, Note,
Whores and Other Sex Slaves: Why the Equation of Prostitution with Sex Trafficking in the William
Wilberforce Reauthorization Act of 2008 Promotes Gender Discrimination, 12 SCHOLAR 139, 159–62
(2009) (describing how law enforcement’s confusion between consensual sex workers and trafficking
victims makes focusing on enforcing anti-prostitution laws against sex workers all the more troubling).
185
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romantic partner before assuming the role of trafficker.190 Moreover, antiprostitution laws have historically been overenforced against those “selling”
sex, usually women, rather than those soliciting sex, usually men.191 Fears of
wrongful enforcement against victims and voluntary sex workers are also
supported by some of the effects of previous feminist legislation, which was
enforced against marginalized communities rather than the legislation’s
original targets.192 And at least one scholar has empirically documented
FOSTA’s consequences for gay and queer men in the San Francisco area,
who have lost income and increasingly fear for their safety as much of the
online sex industry in all its iterations significantly contracted.193 Yet another
commentator deemed FOSTA “a law with a body count” based on data
demonstrating increased violence against sex workers of all kinds in the
months since its passage.194
Finally, for all of FOSTA’s good intentions, it actually does little to
help the vast majority of sex-trafficking victims, who do not fit the mold that
many lawmakers have in mind—a middle-class white female.195 Many
victims are neither white nor female and may come from low-income
communities that are overpoliced, resulting in distrust and decreased
likelihood of cooperation with law enforcement officials.196 These victims
may fear criminalization or be reluctant to rely on a system that has otherwise
failed to protect them.197 Because these victims are less likely to report their
abuse to police, they are hampered in their ability to recover restitution under
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Luzwick, supra note 21, at 366–67.
DeCou, supra note 189, at 435–36; Kaigh, supra note 189, at 160.
192 See de la Cruz, supra note 88, at 89–90 (arguing that police have been known to arrest women of
color, especially transgender women of color, for prostitution rather than arresting their clients).
193 Eichert, supra note 29, at 217–26.
194 Chamberlain, supra note 29, at 2203.
195 See Eichert, supra note 29, at 212–16 (empirically documenting lawmakers’ gendering of sextrafficking victims and perpetrators, as well as analyzing lawmakers’ reliance on anecdotal evidence,
usually “melodramatic, episodic depictions of women and girls, typically of Caucasian descent” being
sex-trafficked). See generally Claudia Cojocaru, Sex Trafficking, Captivity, and Narrative: Constructing
Victimhood with the Goal of Salvation, 39 DIALECTICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 183, 191–93 (2015) (arguing
that the antitrafficking movement has ignored and even harmed victims from marginalized communities
by focusing on stereotypical notions of victimhood and erasing the autonomy of both victims and
consensual sex workers).
196 See supra note 95 and accompanying text; Cojocaru, supra note 195, at 192; see also
GOTTSCHALK, supra note 85, at 129 (describing how people of color in the United States frequently have
more negative contact with police); Eichert, supra note 29, at 236, 243–44 (emphasizing FOSTA’s impact
on men and the need for more research on its effects on genderqueer and nonbinary individuals).
197 See Cojocaru, supra note 195, at 189–93 (describing her experience as a sex-crime victim who
distrusted antitrafficking activists); de la Cruz, supra note 88, at 90–91 (describing the punitive treatment
of women of color and transgender women by police).
191
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FOSTA, which emphasizes the role of law enforcement.198 Further, many
trafficking survivors lack the means to pursue civil litigation against internet
service providers in the way FOSTA contemplates.199 Even if they do sue,
there is still no guarantee that victims will prevail; FOSTA’s drafters
indicated that these provisions might apply to only a few providers.200 If
FOSTA really is interpreted that narrowly, then it is unclear whether it will
really benefit survivors who are able to litigate any more than prior laws
did.201
Perhaps more cynically, as commentators like Professor A.F. Levy have
suggested, lawmakers’ focus on internet service providers’ role in trafficking
may be mere “pageantry” intended to placate feminists and antitrafficking
activists while achieving no real reform.202 FOSTA was passed immediately
after the highly publicized Backpage investigation and shutdown.203 This
swift reaction could indicate genuine concern, but it could also be the result
of purely political motivations.204 Moreover, Backpage’s founders were
indicted for violating the Travel Act, a preexisting anti-prostitution law, and
a law criminalizing money laundering—these laws existed before FOSTA
and remain in effect.205 Thus, FOSTA is little more than a paper tiger in the
supposed war on online sex trafficking.206

198 See H.R. REP. NO. 115-572, pt. 1, at 7 (2018) (revenues collected through FOSTA claims will be
used to contribute to the Crime Victim’s Fund, through which FOSTA survivors can obtain restitution
like other victims of federal crimes).
199 Grant, supra note 15.
200 See H.R. REP. NO. 115-572, supra note 198, at pt.1, at 7 (noting that FOSTA will likely only
apply to a few offenders).
201 See id.; see also J.S. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, L.L.C., 359 P.3d 714, 718 (Wash. 2015)
(holding that a sex-trafficking survivor could state a claim against Backpage not barred by § 230).
202 A.F. Levy, The Virtues of Unvirtuous Spaces, 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 403, 422 (2017) (“The
war on Internet platforms is pageantry: a kind of theater designed to satisfy people’s need to identify and
fight bad guys without regard to nuance or long-term outcome.”).
203 See, e.g., Charlie Savage & Timothy Williams, U.S. Seizes Backpage.com, a Site Accused of
Enabling Prostitution, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/07/us/politics/
backpage-prostitution-classified.html [https://perma.cc/AR2V-P5Z8].
204 See Levy, supra note 202, at 422 (describing Congress’s efforts to target internet service providers
to end online sex trafficking as “a kind of theater designed to satisfy people’s need to identify and fight
bad guys without regard to nuance or long-term outcome”).
205 See Indictment at 1, United States v. Lacey, No. 2:18-cr-00422-SPL (D. Ariz. Mar. 28, 2018).
206 See Glenn Kessler, Has the Sex-Trafficking Law Eliminated 90 Percent of Sex-Trafficking Ads?,
WASH. POST (Aug. 20, 2018, 2:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/08/20/has-sextrafficking-law-eliminated-percent-sex-trafficking-ads [https://perma.cc/J8B8-DPW9] (fact-checking
claims that FOSTA has seriously curtailed sex trafficking by pointing to the lack of data supporting this
assertion as ads dropped after Backpage was shut down, but before the passage of FOSTA, and the volume
has since been increasing).
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Overall, FOSTA, like other legislation that seeks to promote goals
associated with the feminist movement—such as ending violence against and
exploitation of women and other marginalized groups—has failed to serve
many of its intended beneficiaries. Instead, it emphasized punishing
perpetrators, leaving already vulnerable groups caught in the crossfire. Given
these numerous arguments against FOSTA, it is unsurprising that the law is
already facing legal challenges. Still, laws are not invalidated merely for
being ineffective or unwise. FOSTA’s challengers must marshal their best
arguments against FOSTA’s constitutionality. The argument that most
commentators and critics have latched onto is that FOSTA, like some of the
protective speech restrictions that came before it,207 violates the First
Amendment.
C. The First Amendment Case Against FOSTA
Just two months after FOSTA became law, it was challenged on First
Amendment grounds. This Section analyzes the ongoing First Amendment
case against FOSTA and the arguments that could invalidate it, concluding
that courts should find FOSTA unconstitutional.
1.

Woodhull Freedom Foundation v. United States: Procedural
Hurdles to Victory
On June 28, 2018, the Woodhull Freedom Foundation208 and several
other individuals and groups sued to declare FOSTA unconstitutional under
the First Amendment and to enjoin its enforcement.209 In their complaint, the
plaintiffs stressed FOSTA’s chilling effect on political, sex-related speech
and the need to protect the internet from speech regulations due to its role as
“an indispensable place to exchange ideas.”210
The Woodhull Freedom Foundation, for example, advertises online its
annual conference on decriminalizing sex work;211 Woodhull fears that these
advertisements may lead to liability under FOSTA’s broad provisions which
prohibit advertisements that promote and facilitate prostitution.212 Another
plaintiff, Alex Andrews, advocates for sex workers’ health and welfare.213
She believes that FOSTA’s vague provisions may target her work online,
207

See supra Section I.C.
See Complaint, supra note 10, ¶¶ 61–63 (describing the Woodhull Freedom Foundation, a group
that promotes sexual freedom, particularly free sexual speech, and its political activities).
209 Id. ¶¶ 1–2.
210 Id. ¶¶ 2–6, 9.
211 Id. ¶¶ 61–62, 66.
212 Id. ¶ 64.
213 Id. ¶¶ 102–03.
208
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which aims to help people involved in sex work find free services for health,
educational, and other needs.214 Yet another plaintiff, Eric Koszyk, is a
certified massage therapist who has historically advertised online; the main
site he relied on, Craigslist, banned his advertisements in response to
FOSTA.215
These plaintiffs allege that FOSTA is overbroad, reaching far too much
constitutionally protected speech.216 Further, because FOSTA aims to
regulate a specific type of speech—speech promoting commercial sex—the
plaintiffs contend that it is a viewpoint-discriminatory, content-based
restriction on speech.217 As such, FOSTA is not narrowly tailored enough to
survive the First Amendment’s strict scrutiny test for content-discriminatory
speech restrictions.218
The plaintiffs went to federal district court and were promptly thrown
out for lack of standing. The court found their allegations of the Act’s breadth
unpersuasive,219 specifically finding it unlikely that FOSTA could actually
reach their conduct, thus meaning they faced no imminent injury.220 Absent
any injury caused by the statute, the plaintiffs had no standing to sue.221
Additionally, in one pointed footnote, the court called out Alex Andrews’s
previous criminal record for participating in sex work. The court seemed to
suggest that if she was afraid of FOSTA, maybe it was because she was still
working in the sex trade and not because of her advocacy efforts.222

214

Id. ¶¶ 105–12.
Id. ¶¶ 93–97.
216 Id. ¶¶ 127–34.
217 Id. ¶¶ 1, 3, 114 (describing plaintiffs’ various concerns over FOSTA’s targeting of pro-sex-work
views); id. ¶ 4 (arguing that “FOSTA’s prohibitions are entirely content-based” speech restrictions).
218 Id. ¶¶ 141–44 (arguing that such regulations are presumptively invalid and that the law fails strict
scrutiny because it “does not directly advance the government’s objective”). The plaintiffs also alleged
that FOSTA is unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment because it is unlawfully vague and it applies
retroactively in violation of the Fifth Amendment and Article I of the U.S. Constitution. Id. ¶¶ 149–52,
169.
219 Woodhull Freedom Found. v. United States, 334 F. Supp. 3d 185, 196–204 (D.D.C. 2018), rev’d,
948 F.3d 363 (D.C. Cir. 2020); see also Woodhull Freedom Found. v. United States, 948 F.3d 363, 370
(D.C. Cir. 2020) (describing the district court opinion).
220 Woodhull Freedom Found., 334 F. Supp. 3d at 198–204 (finding § 2421A was “plainly calculated
to ensnare only specific unlawful acts with respect to a particular individual, not the broad subject-matter
of prostitution”); see also Woodhull Freedom Found., 948 F.3d. at 370.
221
Woodhull Freedom Found., 334 F. Supp. 3d at 201–03; see also Woodhull Freedom Found.,
948 F.3d. at 370.
222 Woodhull Freedom Found., 334 F. Supp. 3d at 193, 194 n.8 (describing Alex Andrews—also
known as Jesse Maley—and her history with prostitution charges despite the fact that those charges were
not at issue).
215
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The plaintiffs appealed, and the D.C. Circuit proved more sympathetic,
reasoning that the statute could reasonably reach the plaintiffs’ online
speech.223 It specifically noted that Andrews’s advocacy likely did fall within
the vagaries of FOSTA’s prohibition on promoting prostitution and that
Koszyk’s financial injury after Craigslist banned his ads was sufficiently
linked to FOSTA.224 It therefore remanded the case to the district court for
further proceedings on the merits.225 The D.C. Circuit’s opinion arrived in
January 2020, meaning that the challenge to FOSTA’s merits has not yet
been fully developed. Below, this Note explores some of the arguments that
should be made against FOSTA and its dangers to free speech.
2. FOSTA’s First Amendment Implications
The plaintiffs argue that FOSTA runs afoul of the First Amendment in
two ways. First, its provisions include a substantial amount of protected
speech, rendering it facially overbroad.226 Second, since it contains contentbased restrictions—specifically viewpoint discrimination—it fails a strict
scrutiny analysis.227 As explained below, both arguments have merit.
Furthermore, despite the government’s protestations, neither the criminality
and incitement exception nor the obscenity exception should shield FOSTA
from invalidation.
To begin, FOSTA’s sweep may indeed be overbroad as it includes a
substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech. FOSTA proscribes
promoting or facilitating prostitution but fails to explain what online speech
qualifies under either category.228 This opens FOSTA up to restricting far
more than only sex-trafficking advertisements, which, while numerous, were
far from the only sex-adjacent content on websites like Backpage or
Craigslist.229 For example, a court could consider speech that seeks to
improve the health and welfare of sex workers as constituting promotion or
facilitation of prostitution. This speech enables sex workers to engage in
223

Woodhull Freedom Found., 948 F.3d at 371–74 (finding that the plaintiffs had standing).
See id. at 373 (finding “ample reason to conclude that the threat of future enforcement against
Andrews is substantial”); id. at 374 (noting that FOSTA led to the “drying up” of Koszyk’s stream of
clients).
225 See id. at 374. The D.C. Circuit noted that because all of the remaining plaintiffs had substantially
similar claims, there was no need to evaluate their standing individually. See id. at 371.
226 Complaint, supra note 10, ¶¶ 127–34.
227 See id. ¶¶ 1, 3, 114 (arguing FOSTA discriminates against pro-sex-work views expressed online).
228
See FOSTA, Pub. L. 115-164, sec. 3, § 2421A, 132 Stat. 1253, 1253–54 (2018).
229 See McCombs, supra note 17 (discussing Backpage’s predominant use for voluntary sex
workers); see also Levy, supra note 202, at 408–10, 410 n.38 (arguing that increases in online
advertisements for voluntary prostitution do not necessarily indicate a proportionate preponderance of
sex trafficking).
224
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commercial sex by helping them access free services, without which they
might be unable to work or even survive. Additionally, speech that advocates
decriminalizing all sex work could technically be considered “promoting”
prostitution by literally promoting its legalization.230
In this way, FOSTA’s apparent overbreadth chills the legitimate
advocacy and discussion of sex work, which remain protected under the First
Amendment.231 FOSTA does have an affirmative defense that allows
speakers to claim safe harbor if their speech is directed at a jurisdiction where
prostitution is legal, such as several counties in Nevada.232 Nevertheless,
even if they invoke this clause as a defense, potential defendants will already
have suffered repercussions for their speech by being threatened with
prosecution.233 The threat of criminal prosecution, regardless of ultimate
liability, likely suffices to give users and providers pause, therefore chilling
legal speech. More to the point, most United States jurisdictions have not
legalized prostitution, and that is where the bulk of decriminalization
advocacy is likely to occur.
Moreover, even if the Government promises not to enforce FOSTA to
its full breadth, this similarly fails to cure its deficiencies; such promises are
matters of executive discretion and do not bind future administrations.234 And
promises of enforcement do nothing to ameliorate the actual text of the
statute, which is what is at issue here.235 Thus, no matter what the government
says it will do, with FOSTA still on the books, plaintiffs continue to feel the
law’s chilling effect. FOSTA’s inclusion of a substantial amount of
constitutionally protected speech should therefore render it invalid for
overbreadth under the First Amendment.

230 See Woodhull Freedom Found., 948 F.3d at 372–73 (noting that FOSTA’s prohibitions on
promoting or facilitating prostitution could plausibly include advocacy and speech of the sort the plaintiffs
carry out).
231 See Chamberlain, supra note 29, at 2196–2200 (arguing that FOSTA is likely unconstitutional
due to its plausible inclusion of all speech that makes sex work easier to engage in, which could reach
harm reduction, advocacy, and decriminalization efforts like those of the plaintiffs in Woodhull).
232 FOSTA, sec. 3, § 2421A(e); see also Prostitution and Sex Work, supra note 14, at 567–68
(prostitution is completely legal within seven counties in Nevada and may be permitted in certain areas
of six other counties).
233 See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 476, 481–82 (2010) (finding that a safe harbor
provision pertaining to conduct lawful in some jurisdictions but unlawful in others did not sufficiently
narrow the scope of an unlawful speech regulation).
234 See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (“[T]he Government retains broad
discretion as to whom to prosecute.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
235 See Stevens, 559 U.S. at 480–81 (noting that promising not to enforce a law against specific
persons or forms of conduct does not cure its overbreadth based on its actual text).
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FOSTA is also a content-based restriction on speech. Content-based
restrictions—particularly those that discriminate against specific
viewpoints—are presumptively invalid and evaluated under strict scrutiny.236
In FOSTA’s case, the government certainly has a compelling interest in
preventing sex trafficking, which is, of course, illegal throughout the United
States.237 The question is whether FOSTA’s restrictions are sufficiently
narrowly tailored in relation to its compelling interest, and the answer is that
they are not.
First, FOSTA regulates internet speech, which has historically been
entitled to heightened First Amendment protection.238 The Court has time and
again noted the importance of the internet for disseminating and engaging
with new information and ideas and has been reluctant to allow regulation of
this increasingly important medium of communication and education.239
Second, and critically, FOSTA specifically discriminates against a specific
viewpoint: the promotion of prostitution.240 Although prostitution is mostly
illegal in the United States, it is not illegal to campaign for its
decriminalization or even expound its positive attributes. FOSTA, therefore,
constitutes unlawful viewpoint discrimination insofar as it prohibits speech
promoting pro-prostitution and pro-sex-work views.241 Indeed, under the
pornography cases,242 Congress cannot even prohibit pro-trafficking, proabuse, or pro-rape views, as reprehensible as most find them to be.243
FOSTA’s discriminatory prohibitions therefore seem unlikely to survive
under prevailing precedent.

236 Erica Goldberg, Free Speech Consequentialism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 692 (“Laws that
suppress speech on the basis of content are subject to the strictest constitutional scrutiny, which is often
outcome determinative.”); see also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–
30 (1995) (“[V]iewpoint discrimination . . . is presumed impermissible . . . .”).
237 See Ronald Weitzer, Sex Trafficking and the Sex Industry: The Need for Evidence-Based Theory
and Legislation, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1337, 1337 (2012) (describing and defining U.S. law
prohibiting sex trafficking).
238 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 867–70 (1997). The Court has found that some forms of media
(such as television and radio broadcasts) may be subject to more regulation because of their nature, which
allows immediate exposure to possibly harmful material simply by turning a television or radio on. In
contrast, the internet more often requires users to take active steps to find any material—harmful or
otherwise—and so may be subject to fewer regulations. See id. at 867.
239 See id. at 850–53, 863.
240 Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding an anti-pornography
ordinance unconstitutional under the First Amendment due to its viewpoint discrimination against
pornography viewers and people with degrading views of women), aff’d, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
241 See id.
242 See supra Section I.C.
243 See Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 771 F.2d at 330.
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FOSTA’s supporters might suggest that its restrictions are permissible
under the First Amendment exceptions for speech integral to criminal
conduct and incitement because posting “advertisements” aids in unlawful
commercial sex transactions. But these First Amendment exceptions are
narrow. If FOSTA’s provisions go beyond speech that is intertwined with
unlawful commercial sex transactions or likely to incite imminent criminal
conduct, then it is not narrowly tailored.244 Here, FOSTA’s prohibition on
promoting prostitution exceeds the narrow limits of either exception. Unlike
prohibitions on possessing, selling, or purchasing child pornography, for
example, “promotion” can include political advocacy and abstract speech
regarding the morality of prostitution.245 Likewise, FOSTA’s provisions fall
far outside the narrow limits of obscenity.246 If statutes that are modeled after
the Supreme Court’s own obscenity test are not narrow enough for the
obscenity exception,247 then neither is FOSTA, which does not explicitly
cabin its reach.
Overall, the plaintiffs have strong arguments for FOSTA’s
unconstitutionality. These arguments seem even sturdier in light of precedent
invalidating attempts to restrict speech based on its content, particularly on
the internet.248 Of course, much litigation is still to come, and the plaintiffs
could ultimately lose. Prostitution remains illegal in all but a few counties in
Nevada and other forms of sex work remain stigmatized, and these elements
could color a court’s analysis. Sentiments of this stigma rang true in the
district court’s opinion dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims, where it dug into
one plaintiff’s sex-worker past, despite its irrelevance to the case at hand.249
Likewise, scholars have noted that a law’s important or admirable goals may
likewise influence a court’s analysis;250 FOSTA’s noble goal of combating
sex trafficking may thus be similarly influential, leading a court to take a
more generous view of the Act. As such, FOSTA’s fate remains uncertain;
244

See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text.
Compare United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 298–99 (2008) (upholding laws prohibiting
selling or soliciting child pornography), with Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969)
(advocacy for the morality of a criminal act cannot be restricted under the First Amendment).
246 See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 873–74 (1997).
247 See id.
248 See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 464–70 (2010) (invalidating a law targeting “crush
videos” on the internet); Reno, 521 U.S. at 863, 867 (noting that some forms of communication may
receive the highest protection).
249
See Woodhull Freedom Found. v. United States, 334 F. Supp. 3d 185, 194 n.8 (D.D.C. 2018),
rev’d, 948 F.3d 363 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
250 See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 236, at 692–93 (noting that the Supreme Court’s First Amendment
decisions have at times been influenced by a potential balancing of the harms and benefits of a challenged
law despite its clearly violative nature).
245
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invalidating it would accord with First Amendment doctrine, but sustaining
it would play into a trend of ignoring speech harms to marginalized groups251
and encouraging “carceral feminis[t]” legislation.252 Only time will tell if
FOSTA’s flawed provisions will be stricken. As of June 2020, the plaintiffs’
case against FOSTA remains pending in the district court.
III. SOLUTIONS FOR SURVIVORS
This Note has argued FOSTA is unwise and likely unconstitutional. But
FOSTA’s flaws do not render its goals irrelevant. As such, this Part
advocates for adopting alternative reforms that better serve sex-trafficking
survivors and mitigate FOSTA’s harms to other internet speakers. First, it
assesses FOSTA through a feminist lens, arguing that FOSTA should focus
on improving the lives of sex-trafficking survivors rather than focusing on
punishment and thereby inadvertently harming sex workers and other
internet speakers. As a result, this Note proposes a common-fund solution,
which would benefit more survivors without further endangering voluntary
sex workers or free speech.
A. Returning to Feminist Values for Real Reform
As discussed in Section II.A, FOSTA did not come out of nowhere.
Like previous laws inspired by feminist factions, FOSTA was the product of
an unlikely coalition of feminist activists and political conservatives;
FOSTA passed with little opposition because of its broad coalition of
support.253 FOSTA combined the early anti-rape movement’s focus on
punishing perpetrators254 with the anti-pornography movement’s contentbased speech restrictions,255 and it targets online speech, which has been
given heightened protections.256 FOSTA thus creates a perfect storm of

251 See generally Mary Anne Franks, Witch Hunts: Free Speech, #MeToo, and the Fear of Women’s
Words, 2019 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 123 (arguing that while the First Amendment is often used to defend
repugnant male speech, courts have allowed women to be silenced and censored).
252 See Bernstein, supra note 96, at 142–43 (internal quotation marks omitted).
253 See Eichert, supra note 29, at 210 (arguing that both conservative politicians and left-wing, radical
feminists promote similarly restrictive policies that proscribe sexual expression that deviates from either
group’s limited range of acceptable sexual speech or conduct); cf. Bernstein, supra note 96, at 143
(characterizing the anti-sex-trafficking movement behind the TVPRA as a collaboration between
“devoted evangelical and feminist antitrafficking activists and neoconservative Washington think tanks”).
254 See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 85, at 125.
255 See Willis, supra note 100, at 351–52, 356–57. Though the anti-pornography ordinances were
ultimately unsuccessful, they did gain some initial traction. See supra Section I.C.
256 See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
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punitive speech restrictions. As a result, it leaves sex-trafficking survivors
and other internet speakers out to dry.
One likely counterargument to this Note is that many (if not all) of those
affected by FOSTA’s speech restrictions are engaging in or supporting
unlawful sex work. Although not all forms of sex work are currently
criminalized,257 prostitution is, and prostitution is what FOSTA targets. So
why should “law-abiding” Americans care? To begin, as Lucy Khan writes
in her essay on FOSTA’s impact on sex workers and society, FOSTA’s broad
prohibitions on internet speech set a dangerous precedent.258 Although
FOSTA itself only deals with speech related to commercial sex, it has
already affected nonsex workers who advertise online.259
As such, if FOSTA remains in place, it could become precedent for
future content-restrictive laws. At a time when Americans increasingly
distrust government,260 allowing lawmakers to control the proliferation of
internet speech seems dubious at best. The internet has become the ultimate
“marketplace of ideas,” a marketplace that free speech scholars have called
essential for the exchange of ideas and knowledge.261 This has its
drawbacks—some scholars have already critiqued failures to regulate
harassment online, which in turn drives women, people of color, and LGBTQ
people offline262—but it is not clear that the answer to this should be topdown federal intervention as opposed to bottom-up cultural reforms. This is

257 The terms “sex work” and “the sex work industry” generally refer to and encompass various
commercial sex-related acts, many of which are not prohibited by prostitution laws. See Prostitution and
Sex Work, supra note 14, at 553–54.
258 See Khan, supra note †. Additionally, if FOSTA reaches the kind of political speech critics
believe, it offends even those scholars who disagree with the Court’s all-inclusive approach to the First
Amendment. See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245,
255 (arguing that the First Amendment’s central concern is not the power to speak, but “the freedom of
those activities of thought and communication by which we ‘govern’”).
259 See Complaint, supra note 10, ¶¶ 93–97 (describing FOSTA’s impact on massage therapist Eric
Koszyk’s livelihood).
260 See, e.g., Christopher Robertson, D. Alex Winkelman, Kelly Bergstrand & Darren Modzelewski,
The Appearance and the Reality of Quid Pro Quo Corruption: An Empirical Investigation, 8 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 375, 376 (2016) (describing increasing public distrust of government officials).
261 See Meiklejohn, supra note 258 (arguing that the First Amendment’s protections are essential for
maintaining a democratic system).
262 See Mary Anne Franks & Ari Ezra Waldman, Sex, Lies, and Videotape: Deep Fakes and Free
Speech Delusions, 78 MD. L. REV. 892, 892–93, 896 (2019) (arguing that expansive free-speech rights
have been weaponized against “women, queer people, persons of color, and other racial and ethnic
minorities”).
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especially true given that top-down “thought control” measures have been
largely repudiated.263
Furthermore, even if one is not compelled by the free-speech
perspective,264 there are other normative concerns that direct reformers away
from laws that harm sex workers. Feminists are split on the ethics of sex
work, just as they are split on pornography.265 Some, like Professor
MacKinnon, argue that all commercial sex subordinates women as a class.266
Relatedly, Professor Cheryl Nelson Butler has suggested that many sex
workers, especially women of color, were effectively coerced into the trade
due to lack of economic and educational opportunities.267 But these
approaches are not universal. Others, such as Professor I. India Thusi, argue
that feminist scholars opposing sex work often fail to actually account for
the perspectives of the sex workers themselves.268 She argues that feminists
who seek to improve the welfare of all women and marginalized people
should listen to these often-marginalized people as well, even if they disagree
with feminists’ contentions about the exploitative nature of sex work.269
Despite their varying views on sex work, these scholars agree that
current laws that focus on criminalizing conduct related to commercial sex
harm more than they help.270 Professor MacKinnon highlights that
prostitution laws are enforced against “sellers” of sex, typically women, far
more often than they are enforced against “buyers,” who are typically men.271
Professor Butler likewise highlights the problems with criminalizing sex
work for women of color in particular, who are already disproportionately
263 See, e.g., Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 327–28 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d, 475 U.S.
1001 (1986).
264 See e.g., Torrey, supra note 123, at 26–31 (describing how courts have used the First Amendment
to justify allowing women to suffer harms in order to avoid speech harms to society at large, particularly
men).
265 See Sylvia A. Law, Commercial Sex: Beyond Decriminalization, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 523, 532–42
(2000) (describing feminist agreements and disagreements on commercial sex).
266 See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Prostitution and Civil Rights, 1 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 13, 20
(1993).
267 Cheryl Nelson Butler, A Critical Race Feminist Perspective on Prostitution & Sex Trafficking in
America, 27 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 95, 101–02, 135 (2015).
268 See I. India Thusi, Radical Feminist Harms on Sex Workers, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 185,
186–88 (2018); see also R. Claire Snyder-Hall, Third-Wave Feminism and the Defense of “Choice,”
8 PERSPS. ON POL. 255, 257–58 (2010) (critiquing “the judgmental stance” that some radical feminists
like Professor Dworkin adopted toward sex workers and other women who they saw as reinforcing
patriarchal ideals).
269 See Thusi, supra note 268, at 215–18, 229.
270 See Grant, supra note 15; MacKinnon, supra note 266; Butler, supra note 267; Thusi, supra note
268.
271 MacKinnon, supra note 266, at 16–20.
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targeted and mistreated by law enforcement.272 And Professor Thusi
advocates for a position on sex work that actively accounts for the views and
experiences of sex workers themselves, who largely oppose
criminalization.273
The dangers that these scholars highlight apply to those who choose to
engage in sex work as well as to those who are coerced—including sextrafficking survivors. As such, there is feminist consensus that U.S. law’s
current emphasis on punishing sex workers is no solution at all.
Feminist consensus on the need to mitigate harms to women and other
marginalized people demonstrates the need to reform FOSTA. Although
FOSTA does not specifically target sex workers—like other prostitution
laws—it has a net-negative effect on vulnerable and marginalized groups.274
FOSTA was meant to punish powerful internet service providers.275 But in
reality, FOSTA harms voluntary sex workers and, alongside them, sextrafficking victims. Additionally, law enforcement is having an even harder
time apprehending actual traffickers than they did when traffickers were able
to post on Backpage.276 Meanwhile, survivors are not able to reap FOSTA’s
promised benefits due to its failure to account for victims who cannot litigate
or rely on law enforcement. Feminist ideals—and First Amendment law—
call for a new solution that serves FOSTA’s intended beneficiaries without
causing undue harm to others.
B. Proposing a Common Fund
As scholars such as Professor Gottschalk have noted, one of the key
factors that drove feminists to support punitive reforms, as opposed to
comprehensive support for victims of domestic violence, was the United
States’ lack of social safety nets.277 Increasing social supports for everyone
272 Butler, supra note 267, at 114, 135 (describing sex workers’—particularly those who are Black
or other people of color—fears of police and of facing mistreatment by law enforcement).
273 Thusi, supra note 268.
274 See Eichert, supra note 29, at 217–18, 244 (arguing that male, genderqueer, and nonbinary sex
workers are also affected by FOSTA); see also Evan Urquhart, Decriminalizing Prostitution Is Central
to Transgender Rights, SLATE (Feb. 27, 2018, 4:57 PM), https://slate.com/humaninterest/2018/02/decriminalizing-prostitution-is-central-to-transgender-rights.html
[https://perma.cc/3WRJ-EMF3] (arguing against the criminalization of LGBTQ people in sex work, who
are often pushed into the industry by social forces).
275 See H.R. REP. NO. 115-572, supra note 198, at pt. 1, at 3 (highlighting Craigslist, Backpage, and
eBay as targets for FOSTA’s provisions).
276 See Grant, supra note 15; Fischer, supra note 188.
277 See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 85, at 116, 122–24, 126–29 (noting that existing institutional and
ideological frameworks in the United States prompted anti-rape activists to work with government to
provide special support systems for rape victims because of the impact of a lack of social safety nets).
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would provide the greatest benefit to the largest number of people—
including those particularly at risk for being drawn into sex trafficking and
other coerced sex work.278 Making benefits widely available would help
solve FOSTA’s failure to support survivors, as survivors would no longer
need to become involved with law enforcement to obtain restitution or find
the funds to litigate against internet service providers. But such a solution
seems unlikely to occur anytime soon. The United States remains unlikely to
increase financial assistance to residents, as public opinion and politicians
have often tended against broadening social supports, with many Americans
believing that their fellow citizens already expect too much from
government.279
As such, this Note proposes the creation of a special common fund for
sex-trafficking survivors. Common funds allow a large group of similarly
situated individuals to obtain recovery for the harms they have suffered.280
Although common funds are usually established for class action plaintiffs,
they can also be established by legislation.281 For example, following the
attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, Congress
established a common fund from which victims of the attacks or their
families could obtain financial relief.282 The common fund helped streamline
the claim and recovery process for those affected, and helped shield airlines
from countless negligence suits which could have harmed the industry.283
Congress could establish a similar type of fund for sex-trafficking
survivors to obtain financial relief as an alternative to FOSTA’s civil and
criminal claims. Such a fund could streamline the recovery process by
utilizing the existing networks of advocacy organizations that provide

278 See Butler, supra note 267, at 134–39 (describing how current conditions of poverty, lack of
educational opportunities, and inadequate health care push women of color in particular into sex work).
279 See,
e.g., Government, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/27286/government.aspx
[https://perma.cc/8P3L-VTU7] (noting that a 2010 poll found that 56% of Americans surveyed believed
that “most Americans demand more from the government than they are willing to pay” and a recent 2019
poll found that 42% supported reducing government services in order to cut taxes); see also SCHOENFELD,
supra note 83, at 93 (describing the trend in American politics away from providing government support
and toward gutting “welfare state” expenditures).
280 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 29 (AM. L. INST.
2011).
281 See id. § 29 cmt. a; Marshall S. Shapo, Compensation for Victims of Terror: A Specialized
Jurisprudence of Injury, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1245, 1245–46, 1248–50 (2002) (describing Congress’s
establishment of the 9/11 victims’ fund).
282 See Shapo, supra note 281, at 1248–50 (explaining the establishment of the 9/11 fund and how
funds are allocated to victim–claimants).
283 See id. at 1253–55 (explaining that claimants may not recover from the fund unless they waive
their claims against the airlines).
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services to sex-trafficking survivors and encouraging these advocates to help
survivors participate in the claim and recovery process. Notably, these
advocates, who have significant experience working with and getting
resources to survivors, are less likely to perpetuate the kind of stigma and
stereotypes about people involved in the sex trade that disincentivize
survivors from coming forward to law enforcement officials.284 The recovery
process could, like the 9/11 fund, utilize a simple website format, which
allows the direct submission of claims by victims and their families and
provide links to these advocacy groups that could help survivors submit their
claims successfully.285
A common fund would therefore remedy the central weaknesses of
FOSTA. First, it contains no speech restrictions, meaning it does not
implicate the First Amendment whatsoever. And there are critical practical
benefits too. For one thing, FOSTA assumes that survivors can litigate their
claims against exploitative online service providers. Litigation, however, is
expensive and time-consuming, and survivors who are unable to litigate may
be in especially dire need of financial resources and other forms of support.
FOSTA’s restitution provisions also require cooperation with law
enforcement, which some survivors may be reluctant to do.286 In contrast, the
proposed common fund could be created such that it totally avoids the need
for litigation or contact with law enforcement to obtain compensation.
Another troubling aspect of FOSTA is that, for many survivors, it
comes too late. Although the exact number of sex-trafficking victims is hard
to quantify,287 scholars estimate that hundreds of trafficking victims have
been exploited through online advertisements while § 230 provided blanket
immunity to online service providers.288 With the passage of time, evidence
may be lost and memories of witnesses faded, making it that much harder
284

See de la Cruz, supra note 88, at 90–91 (describing how women involved in the sex industry,
especially women of color, are less likely to report crimes against them to law enforcement based on fears
of mistreatment or even physical violence from law enforcement); Grant, supra note 15 (describing how
antitrafficking advocates are more attuned to different experiences within the commercial sex trade as
compared to law enforcement officials and lawmakers who often conflate voluntary and coerced sex
work).
285 See September 11th Victim Compensation Fund Claim Form, SEPT. 11TH VICTIM COMP. FUND,
https://www.vcf.gov/sites/vcf/files/resources/VCFClaimForm.pdf [https://perma.cc/SJ7U-QFZ9]
(instructing people affected by the September 11 attacks how to submit claims).
286 See Kaigh, supra note 189, at 166 (arguing that conflating sex work and sex trafficking negatively
affects trafficking survivors by deterring them from coming forward to police for fear of arrest for
prostitution).
287 See Weitzer, supra note 237, at 1353–57 (arguing that data on human trafficking are often
inaccurate, based on shoddy methods, and, in some cases, merely conjecture).
288 See Leary, supra note 154, at 622.
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for these survivors to attempt to recover under FOSTA’s litigation
provisions. For many of these survivors, FOSTA may not just be justice
delayed, but justice denied.
On the other hand, the creation of a common fund, from which any sextrafficking survivor could obtain at least some financial relief, would help
victims of past crimes obtain the support they need. The 9/11 fund, of course,
pertains to the specific time period of the attacks; nonetheless, victims and
family members remain able to submit claims.289 A recent reauthorization of
the fund extended the deadline for filing claims to October 2090.290 A
common fund for sex-trafficking survivors could cover a smaller timeframe,
such as from 2000 (when human trafficking was officially recognized under
federal law)291 to 2030, and still provide significant relief to many survivors
who may not be able to bring a civil or criminal case. Moreover, a commonfund recovery process would not require the same level of proof as a criminal
or even a civil trial,292 and although the survivor’s compensation might be
smaller than with a lawsuit, it would be less expensive and time-consuming
to pursue, just as with the 9/11 fund.293
One might argue that a common fund is unreasonable because of the
problem of finding sufficient funds. However, Congress need not necessarily
even dedicate new funds to this project. Rather, Congress could utilize the
government’s ongoing case against Backpage’s founders to obtain the
requisite finances. Congress identified Backpage as a “market leader” with
tremendous assets; prior to being seized in the spring of 2018, Backpage was
valued at more than $500 million and collected over 80% of all revenue
generated by the online sex trade in the United States.294 Federal prosecutors
are currently trying to seize the assets of Backpage’s former owners in the

289

See September 11th Victim Compensation Fund Claim Form, supra note 285.
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, SEPT. 11TH VICTIM COMP. FUND,
https://www.vcf.gov/ [https://perma.cc/K8ZV-ZBFH].
291 Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464
(codified as amended in 22 U.S.C.).
292 The 9/11 fund claim form consists of a twenty-page questionnaire inquiring about the claimants
and their specific experiences and injuries. While somewhat lengthy, it is still something that could be
completed over a period of days, as compared to months or even years for a lawsuit. See September 11th
Victims Compensation Fund Claim Form, supra note 285.
293 This fund would be unlikely to receive the same level of financing that the 9/11 fund has; as of
2019, claimants received anywhere from $86 to over $7 million. September 11 Victim Aid and
Compensation
Fast
Facts,
CNN
(Sept.
2,
2019,
4:15
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2013/07/27/us/september-11th-victim-aid-and-compensation-fastfacts/index.html [https://perma.cc/FL5G-QEG4].
294 See SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 166, at 1–3, 6.
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ongoing case against them,295 and FOSTA already provides for asset
appropriation and redistribution in accordance with existing restitution
law.296 This Note only proposes modifying this scheme to make it easier for
survivors to access funds through a direct request to the fund rather than
going through law enforcement channels.
On the other hand, this asset-forfeiture mechanism might still play into
the pitfalls of punitiveness297 or possibly present its own constitutional
concerns.298 Alternatively, implementing a shared payment scheme among
online service providers provides a less punitive option. Like other forms of
risk-sharing, such as workers’ compensation,299 online service providers
could buy into a risk-sharing pool by paying into the common fund. These
funds could then be allocated to claimants injured by being advertised for
commercial sex online.
In essence, a common-fund scheme would prioritize providing benefits
to victims over attributing blame to online service providers. Just as workers’
compensation sought to encourage employers to improve safety conditions
without increasing litigation, this risk-spreading scheme could encourage
online service providers to monitor for sex trafficking on their sites while not
creating as great of an incentive to unduly censor all sex- or sex-work-related
content because there would be no unexpected, expensive lawsuits.300 Such
a scheme would not pose as great a chilling effect on internet speech as
FOSTA’s current language, but would still provide benefits to victims and
promote good-faith monitoring as § 230 originally promised.301 Furthermore,
focusing on benefits over blame addresses feminist scholars’ concerns with
current anti-prostitution laws, thus helping survivors without harming
voluntary sex workers.302
295

Justice Department Leads Efforts to Seize Backpage.com, supra note 167.
FOSTA, Pub. L. 115-164, sec. 3, § 2421A(d), 132 Stat. 1253, 1254 (2018); 18 U.S.C. § 2327(b).
297 See Bernstein, supra note 96, at 143 (describing the pitfalls of carceral feminism).
298 See generally Note, How Crime Pays: The Unconstitutionality of Modern Civil Asset Forfeiture
as a Tool of Criminal Law Enforcement, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2387 (2018) (discussing the questionable
constitutionality of civil and criminal asset forfeiture schemes).
299 See Paul Raymond Gurtler, Comment, The Workers’ Compensation Principle: A Historical
Abstract of the Nature of Workers’ Compensation, 9 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 285, 292–94 (1989)
(describing the evolution of workers’ compensation laws in the United States).
300 See id. at 295 (describing workers’ compensation’s usefulness at reducing civil suits, providing
relief for injured employees, and incentivizing reasonable safety measures as compared to a pre-workers’
compensation scheme).
301 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2); see also Leary, supra note 154, at 161–62 (discussing the original
purpose of § 230).
302 See Grant, supra note 15; MacKinnon, supra note 266; Butler, supra note 267; Thusi, supra note
268, at 228.
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In this way, establishing a common fund would allow sex-trafficking
survivors to recover compensation without contravening the First
Amendment. Further, by existing outside of the very expensive and timeconsuming litigation framework, a common fund allows recovery for all
survivors, not just those with the means to litigate or the privilege to
cooperate with law enforcement without being treated as a criminal.303
Although a common fund would not end online sex trafficking, neither has
FOSTA. Recent data indicate it has merely driven traffickers underground
or to harder-to-find platforms rather than out of existence.304 At the very least,
a common fund would provide benefits for a greater number of survivors
with lower costs to them and with less risk of endangering voluntary sex
workers, advocates, or any other internet speakers.
CONCLUSION
FOSTA’s fate remains uncertain. A growing number of scholars and
commentators have called for its repeal or invalidation, and the D.C. Circuit
gave the go-ahead for just that result. But FOSTA’s demise would not end
the project of supporting sex-trafficking survivors. Indeed, FOSTA’s
invalidation or repeal presents a new opportunity to enact meaningful reform
tailored to the needs of survivors. Although the idea of punishing bad actors
appeals to many, FOSTA’s form of punishment endangers not only online
service providers that profit from commercial sex, but also free internet
speech, consensual sex workers, and even sex-trafficking victims
themselves. Because FOSTA infringes on the First Amendment, incentivizes
websites to censor consensual sex workers and advocates, and does not
adequately aid sex-trafficking survivors, Congress should enact a solution to
address all of these concerns. A common fund does just that.
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See DeCou, supra note 189, at 436–39; GOTTSCHALK, supra note 85, at 129.
See supra notes 188, 206, 276 and accompanying text.
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